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ABSTRACT
Consent decrees – the unheralded workhorses of regulatory law – play
a critical role in environmental law. The bulk of major environmental disputes at the federal level are resolved through consent decrees lodged under
judicial supervision, and key federal environmental statutes and policies
directly require settling parties to use consent decrees to resolve their claims.
These proposed decrees, however, typically receive only a restrained judicial
review that does not yield a formal judicial opinion on the full merits of the
agreement. Parties, in fact, will frequently insist that the decree will not
involve an admission of liability or any conclusions of law. As a result,
consent decrees operate as the dark matter of environmental law – an unseen
supporting medium that surrounds and supports the statutory and regulatory
directives that function within it, but which leaves few marks of its own. These
decrees play a similar role in several other legal fields, including antitrust,
consumer protection, class actions, labor, and bankruptcy.
Most of the public and scholarly scrutiny of consent decrees has focused
on concerns about their potential effects on third parties and their constraints
on future executive discretion or administrative action without proper democratic accountability or transparency. This Article reverses that perspective.
It assumes that consent decrees can appropriately create and foster emerging
legal principles, and it suggests strategies to identify these new legal holdings.
This Article proposes three ways by which consent decrees substantially
influence the development of environmental law and flag new emerging
principles.

*

Associate Instructional Professor, University of Houston Law Center; CoDirector of the Center for Carbon Management in Energy at the University of
Houston; chair-elect of the American Association of Law School’s Environmental
Law Section; Regent, American College of Environmental Law; chair, Climate
Change, Sustainable Development, & Ecosystems Committee of the American
Bar Association’s Section on Environment, Energy & Resources. My thanks for
the excellent comments and assistance from commenters at the Vermont Law
School Environmental Scholarship Colloquium in 2018, my faculty colleagues at
the University of Houston Law Center who participated in workshop review
sessions (in particular Teddy Rave, Gina Warren, and Victor Flatt), Michael
Pappas, Seema Kakade, David Owens, Katrina Kuhl, Heather Payne, and my
outstanding research assistants, Zach Scott and Srikaran Mahavadi.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6

688

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

First, consent decrees can serve as a platform to implement nascent
regulatory policy prior to the formal promulgation of rules or regulations. In
a sense, consent decrees in these circumstances provide a test bed for new
environmental practices and expectations that later mature into full-fledged
regulatory standards. This function of consent decrees tends to surface most
visibly during coordinated enforcement initiatives involving industrial sectors
at the federal level.
Second, consent decrees can generate new law through deferential
review by the courts that lodge them. When courts weigh a proposed consent
decree to determine whether to accept it, they use a relaxed review standard
that does not require the court to closely assess the merits or legal conclusions
of the settlement. Such a review parallels, in many respects, the deferential
judicial review of administrative agency action under the federal Administrative Procedure Act. This historical deferential review of agency action
nonetheless has sketched the contours of numerous important principles of
environmental law; relaxed judicial determinations of the legality and
fairness of consent decrees may play a similar role.
Last, and most controversial, consent decree judgments arguably can
directly embody legal holdings that, at minimum, have persuasive value for
subsequent court proceedings. These holdings, in certain circumstances,
might even rise to the level of precedential rulings entitled to stare decisis in
future actions. This final role of consent decrees in generating environmental
law, however, requires careful consideration to avoid the risks of
manipulation or erosion of judicial authority.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consent decrees are the unheralded workhorses of United States
regulatory law. In part due to their hybrid nature as mutual contracts and
juridical decrees, these consensual judgments serve as a primary vehicle for
judicial implementation and oversight of some of the largest and most
significant disputes in civil rights, antitrust, labor, immigration, class actions,
bankruptcy, and environmental law.1 For example, the U.S. Department of
the Interior alone entered into over 460 consent decrees and settlements
between January 1, 2012, and January 17, 2017, that resulted in over $4.4

1. Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 46 (1987)
(noting that nearly half of federal court dispositions in 1985 arose from either
consent judgments or dismissals predicated on consent as tracked in the Federal
Court Data Base maintained by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts); Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 327,
335 (1987) (“[m]ost environmental enforcement actions against private parties are
resolved by negotiated consent decrees”); see also infra text accompanying notes
2–5 (overview of consent decree usage in federal court system).In one illustrative
example, on July 16, 2019, the City of Houston and the U.S. Department of Justice
formally announced a settlement of their protracted struggle over the city’s
alleged failure to comply with the federal Clean Water Act. Consent Decree,
United States and State of Texas v. City of Houston, Texas (No. 90-5-1-1-08687/1
S.D. Tex., July 16, 2019), https://www.publicworks.houstontx.gov/wastewatercd [https://perma.cc/TRS9-DGRD].. The proposed resolution requires a sweeping
program to revamp the city’s sanitary sewer systems, and it includes an eyepopping price tag: an increase in wastewater costs of over $2 billion spread out
over fifteen years. Jasper Scherer & Mike Morris, Council approves $2B upgrade
with EPA to upgrade Houston’s sanitary sewers, HOUSTON CHRONICLE at A1
(July 24, 2019 4:56 PM) https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Council-approves-2B-agreement-with-EPA-to14121965.php [https://perma.cc/V46B-A8RN].
Beyond the increases in
wastewater costs, the total cost of the consent decree commitments (including
baseline costs) exceeds $5 billion. The settlement has already ignited protests that
the parties negotiated it in secrecy without input from the public, and that it could
saddle poor and disadvantaged communities with higher water bills. Jen Rice,
‘Secrecy Provision’ Prevented Public Input on Houston’s $2 Billion Deal To Fix
Sewers, HOUSTON PUBLIC MEDIA (July 16, 2019 6:06 PM),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2019/07/16/339729/secrecyprovision-blocks-public-input-on-houstons-2-billion-deal-to-fix-sewers/
[https://perma.cc/4QZK-6UU9]. What is remarkable about this proposed decree
– and many others like it – is that it is largely unremarkable, at least from a legal
perspective, and fairly represents the type of sizable environmental disputes
resolved by consent judgments.
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billion in monetary awards.2 The value of environmental remedies compelled
by consent decrees in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) civil
enforcement actions exceeded $4.5 billion in the first six months of 2019,3
and the federal courts entered 109 consent decrees to resolve civil environmental lawsuits in 2018 alone.4
This widespread use of consent decrees has many causes.5 Some federal
statutes, regulations, and policies, for example, explicitly require the United
States to use consent decrees lodged in federal courts to settle certain types of
environmental claims.6 In addition, consent decrees offer important benefits,
including access to the court’s contempt power to enforce the decree and the
2. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, ORDER. NO 3368, PROMOTING
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONSENT DECREES AND
SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
(2018),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/so_3368_promoting_tra
nsparency_and_accountability_in_consent_decrees_and_settlement_agreements
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2XW-BC45]. Unfortunately, the U.S. Department of
Interior does not provide separate data for the number of consent decrees within
this total figure.
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement and Compliance
History Online database (2019), http://echo.epa.gov https://perma.cc/EBT5BZBS (search for total value of complying actions required by judicial settlement
in first six months of 2019).
4. Federal Judicial Center, Integrated Civil Database (2019), www.fjc.gov
[https://perma.cc/KZ6N-RUDQ](search for all cases resolved in 2019 by
settlement with verification of entry of consent decree).
5. This article focuses on the ways the consent decrees in federal courts can
create new strands of environmental law. State courts and Article I federal courts
also have the power to review and lodge consent settlements as decrees or
judgments, but their potential effects vary according to the underlying organic
federal statute or state laws where their legislatures and superior courts may
dictate how much precedential power or effect a consent ruling might have.
6. EPA has long preferred to use consent decrees to resolve the bulk of its
civil judicial enforcement actions. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Guidance for Drafting Judicial Consent Decrees, EPA General Enforcement
Policy GM-17 (Oct. 19, 1983) (“[t]he settlement of a potential civil judicial action
should almost always result in a negotiated consent decree”); U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the Environmental
Protection Agency, EPA General Enforcement Policy GM-14 (Oct. 12, 1982)
(superseded on other grounds) (“[h]istorically, most of the EPA’s civil litigation
referrals have been settled in judicially-enforceable consent decrees containing
requirements for plant modification, upgrading or installation of pollution control
equipment, and other forms of injunctive relief.”). Some environmental statutes
also specifically require the use of consent decrees to resolve certain disputes.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§9622(d)(1)(A) (2018) (cleanup agreements made under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) “shall be entered in the appropriate United States district court as a
consent decree.”).
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ability to avoid sovereign immunity defenses that governmental defendants
might potentially raise, over bare settlement agreements.7
One other key advantage makes consent decrees especially attractive to
litigants: like other forms of settlements and arbitral decisions, they leave no
footprints. Parties will often settle a case with the expectation – and stipulation – that the resolution contains no factual or legal admissions that could
affect future proceedings between the parties and, by extension, future
litigants. Consent decrees, by design, can therefore help resolve the largest
disputes without disrupting existing environmental case law principles or
creating unfavorable precedents that might haunt future litigation.
Because of their lack of precedential heft, consent decrees consistently
get overlooked as sources of environmental law. Most public criticism of
consent decrees,8 as well as scholarly assessment of their proper role and use,9
consistently elides their key role as a potential source of law and policy. Like
settlements, private arbitral awards, and unreported opinions,10 consent
decrees get shelved in a jurisprudential netherworld where courts review,
approve, lodge, and administer them, but they rarely act as a possible source
of guidance or statement of legal principles to inform future judicial decisions.
Effectively, consent decrees are discounted almost entirely as a source of
organically persuasive legal guidance or precedential authority. The prospective deliberate use of consent decree judgments by courts or parties to
shape useful and durable legal precedents and values consequently also gets
short shrift.

7. See Whitfield v. Pennington, 832 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(citing United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439–40 (former 5th Cir.
Dec. 1981)) (“[a] consent order, while founded on the agreement of the parties, is
nevertheless a judicial act, enforceable by sanctions including a citation for
contempt”); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441–42 (2004) (state immunity did
not bar enforcement of the consent decree because the decree was a federal court
order that resulted from a federal dispute and furthered the objectives of federal
law, and the officials voluntarily accepted the obligations set out in the decree).
8. See, e.g., Senator Lamar Alexander, Free the People’s Choice, LEGAL
TIMES at 58 (April 4, 2005) (objecting to limits imposed by institutional consent
decrees on democratic accountability, and advocating for passage of the Federal
Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109 Cong., 1st Sess.); see also infra text
accompanying notes 49–51.
9. Several commentators have questioned whether consent decrees can,
without more, have binding effects on non-litigant third parties without violating
constitutional constraints for due process. Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and
the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 338 (1988); see also infra text
accompanying notes 52–-53.
10. This article will not explore similar issues raised by the resolution of
disputes through private settlement contracts, administrative consent orders,
unilateral administrative orders, supplemental environmental projects, arbitral
awards, or other non-judicial resolutions of contested actions. While fascinating,
they lie beyond the modest scope of this analysis.
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This Article explores the possibility that consent decrees, like other judicial instruments and opinions, deserve attention in their own right as a possible
source of substantive principles, persuasive examples, or even authoritative
precedents in environmental law. This expanded jurisprudential role for
consent decrees would necessarily operate under different rules than traditional processes of persuasive authority, stare decisis, and the mechanisms of
precedent. Because judges play a different role in the review and lodging of
consent decrees than their usual dominant position in crafting opinions and
remedies, the factors that give some consent decrees weight over others will
differ as well. In addition, consent decrees may offer troubling opportunities
for undue power and influence by certain parties who can insist on terms and
provisions across multiple consent decrees in a strategic fashion to shape
precedent by consensual design – including, notably, the United States.11
While consent decrees frame judicial oversight and enforcement in
multiple legal arenas – most notably in antitrust and civil rights – this Article
focuses on their role in environmental and natural resources law.12 In this
sphere, federal law requires their use for certain settlements and mandates
public notice about the terms of the decrees. The United States has
aggressively used consent decrees as a tool to implement environmental
mandates, and these tactics have included the use of model consent decrees
that set out the key terms and conditions that the federal government will
accept. 13 As a result, environmental consent decrees offer a well-developed
body of decisions lodged over a period of forty years in a relatively transparent
process mandated by federal statutes or regulations – which should make it a
strong test case to assess the possible role for allowing consent decrees to act
as persuasive, or even precedential, authority in limited circumstances.
This Article proposes that consent decrees can create new environmental
law through three parallel pathways.14 First, consent decrees can serve as a

11. Litigants, of course, may already exercise a limited ability to mold
judicial precedent and legal interpretations through the strategic use of
conventional settlement agreements to foster or terminate appeals with the goal
of protecting favorable rulings from appellate review or influencing the choice of
judicial fora.
12. Interestingly, relatively few instances have arisen where consent decrees
resolve claims that cut across more than one of these fields simultaneously. But it
can occur; for example, class action lawsuit pressing environmental claims can
result in consent decrees, and a larger antitrust consent decree can address
environmental claims. See, e.g., In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales
Litig., 270 F.R.D. 330, 338 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Presumably, these multi-field consent
decrees will generate new laws in their respective fields in the same ways, but
exploring that assumption lies outside the scope of this article.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 68–70.
14. Apart from their generation of new environmental legal standards,
consent decrees can also spark more general changes in expected standards of
practice and care in an industry sector. As a result, the substance of consent decree
settlements can alter duties owed to other parties in ways that can affect potential
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platform to implement nascent regulatory policy prior to the formal promulgation of rules or regulations. In a sense, consent decrees in these circumstances provide a test bed for new environmental practices and expectations
that later mature into full-fledged regulatory standards. This function of
consent decrees tends to surface most visibly during coordinated enforcement
initiatives involving industrial sectors at the federal level. Second, consent
decrees can generate new law through deferential review by the courts. When
courts weigh a proposed consent decree to determine whether to lodge it, they
use a relaxed standard that does not require the court to substantively assess
the merits or legal conclusions of the settlement. This type of review parallels,
in many respects, the deferential review that federal courts use when assessing
administrative agency action under the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
The historical deferential judicial review of agency administrative action
nonetheless has generated numerous important principles of environmental
law. Judicial determinations of the legality and fairness of consent decrees
may play a similar role.
Last, and most controversial, consent decree judgments arguably can
directly embody legal holdings that, at a minimum, have persuasive value for
subsequent court proceedings. These holdings, in certain circumstances,
might even rise to the level of precedential rulings entitled to stare decisis in
future actions. This last role of consent decrees in generating environmental
law, however, requires close cabining and careful consideration to avoid the
risks of manipulation or erosion of judicial authority. This Article concludes
with a suggested test run on applying these concepts to the United States’
recent consent decrees, including recent settlements of enforcement actions
against automobile manufacturers for illegally installing defeat devices that
produced fraudulent data in violation of the federal Clean Air Act. It then
offers some suggestions for future research.

II. CONSENT DECREES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Weighing the generative role of consent decree judgments in
environmental law raises difficult challenges because of the slippery nature of
consent decrees themselves. Facially, a consent decree is simply defined as
an agreement between parties that a judge then enters as a judicial order or
court decree.15 As a result, they range from largely private contractual
tort liability. This mechanism for legal impact arises from all settlements and legal
resolutions, and its operation predates the rise of modern environmental law.
While important and noteworthy, this pathway to new legal principles will not be
explored separately by this article.
15. Resnik, supra note 1, at 43; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Decree (11th ed.
2019) (“consent decree (1831): A court decree that all parties agree to”); Consent
Decree,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/consent%20decree (last visited May 28, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/9HP2-YZBL] (“[A] judicial decree that sanctions a voluntary
agreement between parties in dispute”); What is CONSENT DECREE?, THE LAW
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commitments approved by the court which resolve contested cases, such as
settlement agreements simply lodged with the court, up to fully contested
judgments crafted largely by the judge in an effort to broker a resolution.16
They also clearly differ in a fundamental fashion from arbitration awards,
mediation agreements, or other varieties of alternative dispute resolution.17
The authority of a court to enter a consent decree arises from an agreement of the parties and the court’s inherent power to oversee and enforce

DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/consent-decree/ (last visited May 28,
2020) [https://perma.cc/5TJF-7WV4] (“One entered by consent of the parties; it
is not properly a judicial sentence, but is in the nature of a solemn contract or
agreement of the parties, made under the sanction of the court, and in effect an
admission by them that the decree [is] a just determination of their rights upon the
real facts of the case, if such facts had been proved.”).
16. By contrast, settlement agreements are private agreements that the court
need not review or approve. This general rule has important exceptions which
may lead a court to review proposed settlements in class actions, shareholder
derivative suits, actions with appointed receivers, settlements of antitrust
enforcement actions initiated by the United States, and “a variety of contexts
where the settlement requires court action, particularly if it affects the rights of
nonparties or nonsettling parties, or where the settlement is executed by a party
acting in a representative capacity.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) §13.14 (2020). Settlement agreements, including private agreements
not brought before the court, obviously offer a broader universe of case
resolutions of which consent decrees constitute only a subset. Settlement
agreements not lodged in court, however, cannot provide a comparable platform
to generate new legal principles. For example, while a large body of private
settlements might serve as a test bed for emerging regulatory standards of care,
those settlements will not enjoy judicial review (even under a relaxed standard of
review) or offer potential persuasive or binding authority for future cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 37–41.
17. Some jurists disagree on whether a court can enter a consent decree when
the parties have agreed to resolve their underlying dispute, which arguably would
thereby deprive the court of a case or controversy for judicial review. See, e.g.,
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 786 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice William Rehnquist had his own opinions on the issue. Dissenting in
Maryland v. United States, Justice Rehnquist stated that once parties had agreed
to withdraw or a settle a lawsuit, no constitutional Case or Controversy remained;
thus, courts lacked the power to insist upon any particular agreement. 460 U.S.
1001, 1004 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a subsequent dissenting opinion,
Justice Rehnquist further muddied the waters when, in protesting a court’s entry
of a consent decree where the parties had negotiated but to which an intervenor
objected, he suggested a new form of judgment – a “judicial decree” – may be
entered over the objections of intervenors, questioning whether such a decree
would properly be a “consent decree” or a coercive court order. Local No. 93,
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
539 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a more developed explanation of
Rehnquist’s theories on consent decrees, see Resnick supra note 1, at 61–62.
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settlements of contested cases before it.18 As a result, a judge need not adjudicate liability before entering a settlement, even over the objection of one of
the parties to a multiparty decree.19 This inherent authority in turn allows a
court to approve a consent decree that includes remedial actions or relief
accepted by the parties that the court could not order itself under the original
claims.20
Past these straightforward predicates, the boundaries quickly blur. The
difficulties mount particularly when parties and courts try to approve, enter,
implement, or modify consent decrees because such judgments exist in a state
of juridical superposition: they are simultaneously both binding contracts
between litigants as well as official orders of the court.21 Courts will consequently interpret the terms of consent decrees pursuant to contract law norms
and strive to discern the intent of the parties as expressed by the terms of their
agreement.22 But judges also treat consent decrees as full-fledged judicial
instruments subject to enforcement through the court’s powers of contempt.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “consent decrees ‘have attributes both
of contracts and of judicial decrees,’ a dual character that has resulted in
different treatment for different purposes.”23
18. Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1879) (“[p]arties to a suit have
the right to agree to any thing they please in reference to the subject-matter of
their litigation, and the court, when applied to, will ordinarily give effect to their
agreement, if it comes within the general scope of the case made by the
pleadings”); see also Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C.
v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (noting that courts can lodge and
enforce consent decrees that provide broader relief than the court could have
awarded in the original action); Ho v. Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 547
(5th Cir. 1988). Federal guidance, however, has narrowed the ability of
governmental agencies to enter into consent decrees that provide payments to nonparties or that do not address directly remedy the harm underlying the lawsuit. See
infra notes 49–51; see also Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016 H.R. 5063,
114th Cong. (2016) (proposed bill thats terms strongly influenced the subsequent
DOJ and EPA guidance on consent decrees).
19. Lawyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 578–79 (1997) (holding
that the court did not need to resolve constitutionality of statute prior to entering
consent decree and that the court properly lodged the decree over objection of an
intervening party whose claims were not discharged or prejudiced by the decree).
For all practical purposes, however, a federal court typically will not enter a
consent decree over the objection of the U.S. government. S. Dabney, Consent
Decrees Without Consent, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1053, 1059 (1963) (noting general
rule that consent decrees require consent of both plaintiffs and defendants, while
noting some antitrust cases where court entered consent decrees over objections
of United States).
20. See supra note 18.
21. Ho, 845 F.2d at 547.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117–18 (1932).
23. Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986) (quoting
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235–37, n. 10 (1975)).
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The courts have constructed a general framework for approving consent
decrees that draws on different sources depending on the subject matter of the
decree. For consent decrees under statutes that do not specify standards for
entry, federal courts will generally assess whether the decree is fair,
reasonable, adequate, and consistent with applicable law.24 Congress, in
addition, has set out statutory requirements for trial court entry of consent
decrees in several areas, including antitrust,25 immigration,26 banking,27 and
environmental law.28 While many of these statutes do not provide substantive
guidance on how the courts should review decrees prior to entry, some set out
specific standards of review. For example, the Tunney Act requires that
consent decrees that resolve antitrust enforcement actions must serve the
“public interest.”29 Even these statutes, however, rarely offer any more
specific standards beyond general terms for the court’s review of a consent
decree’s entry.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specify a particular procedure for the entry of civil consent decrees with the exception of consent
decrees that settle class action lawsuits.30 In that instance, Rule 23(e) sets out
the standards that federal courts must use to review consent decrees or
settlements that resolve class action litigation. While it requires federal courts
to approve the dismissal or compromise of any class action and dictates the
settlement must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” the rule sheds little light
on the standards that a judge should use to review the agreement.31 The

24. United States v. Union Electric Co., 132 F.3d 422, 430 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 522 F.Supp.2d 1107 (E.D.Wis.
2007).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2018).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2018).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 67 (2018).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1) (2018).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(h) (2018).
30. See infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. CIV. P.
Rule 23 and class action lawsuit settlements).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) was amended in 2018 to provide that:
[i]f the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a
hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after
considering whether:
(A)the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
class;
(B)the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;
(C)the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i)the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
(ii)the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class,
including the method of processing class-member claims;
(iii)the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of
payment;
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explosive growth of aggregate litigation and use of multidistrict litigation
management has also spurred judicial review of consent decrees that resolve
the claims of large numbers of individual plaintiffs in coordinated litigation.32
In response, the Manual for Complex Litigation (“Manual”)33 relies on longstanding common law standards to create an additional framework for judicial
review of settlements and consent decrees that resolve complex litigation.34
The Manual essentially requires the court find that the settlement “is fair to
the interests of the persons the court is to protect” and provide for fair notice
of the agreement to affected parties.35 The court, if circumstances warrant,
can hold a hearing to allow public comment on the proposed settlement.36
(iv)any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and
(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.
These elaborations on Rule 23(e)(2)’s standard of review, however, focus on
procedural protections to assure that the class members receive fair notice and
representation during the settlement process. They do not provide substantial new
insight on the substantive content of the “fair, reasonable, and adequate” standard
itself.
32. Multidistrict litigation now comprises over one-third of the entire federal
civil docket. Andrew D. Brandt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the
“Haves” on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation,
108 GEO. L.J. 73, 75 (2019). Notably, some of the largest recent environmental
consent decrees have resolved complex litigation brought under the MDL process,
including the BP Deepwater Horizon spill and the Volkswagen emission defeat
device litigation. Andrew D. Brandt, Multidistrict Litigation and Adversarial
Legalism, 53 GA. L. REV. 1375, 1381 (2019); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil
Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook
Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2017). For a
comprehensive recounting of the use of MDL procedures in a large complex
environmental lawsuit that resulted in a successfully lodged consent decree, see
John C. Cruden, Steve O’Rourke, & Sarah D. Himmelhoch, The Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill Litigation: Proof of Concept for the Manual for Complex
Litigation and the 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 65, 132–40 (2016).
33. The Manual is an authoritative and widely respected resource produced
by the Federal Judiciary Center (“Center”), which is the research and education
agency of the U.S. federal court system. Congress created the Service at the
recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1967. See 28
U.S.C. § 620 (2018).
34. Multidistrict litigation, complex litigation, and class action settlements
often resolve tort claims and seek compensatory damages that lie outside the
province of typical environmental compliance and cost recovery litigation.
Nonetheless, the legal standards and principles that underlie the entry of environmental consent decrees in conventional litigation closely parallel the review of
consent decrees that resolve MDL environmental litigation.
35. MANUAL, supra note 16, at § 13.14, at 172–73.
36. Id. at 173. Notably, the Manual’s discussion of judicial review of
settlements does not provide separate review standards or procedures for consent
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These court-driven standards subsequently have influenced judicial review of
consent decree entries involving smaller numbers of parties in other fields of
law.37
Outside of these statutory exceptions, the federal courts have a relatively
limited role in their review and approval of consent decrees for entry as judgments. Before it can enter a consent decree, a court must first confirm that it
has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute underlying the decree, the
decree falls within the “general scope of the case made by the pleadings,” and
the decree accords with “the objectives of the law upon which the complaint
was based.”38 After confirming that the decree meets these minimal requirements, the trial court cannot insist on any particular provision in the settlement
that the parties have not reached themselves.39 While a judge can approve a
consent decree that provides broader relief than the court could have awarded
after trial,40 this authority does not extend to terms that conflict with or violate
the statute underlying the complaint.41 The court can hold a fairness hearing
at its discretion, but it generally is not required to do so.42

decrees generally. It does, however, discuss consent decree review and approval
in great detail for settlements lodged in specific subject matter areas, including
consent decrees resolving litigation under CERCLA. Id. at § 34.33, pp. 686–687.
37. Resnick, supra note 1, at 57. .
38. Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986). Courts have
rejected environmental consent decrees when they failed to further the objectives
of the underlying statute. Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 780
F. Supp. 95, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (consent decree awarding litigation expenses
to environmental plaintiffs contravened objectives of the federal Clean Water
Act); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1990).
39. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Resnick, supra note 1, at 60
(noting the active participation of judges in settlement negotiations which might
lead to consent decrees).
40. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525;see also Lars Noah, Administrative ArmTwisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WISC.
L. REV. 873, 925 (1997).
41. Resnick, supra note 1, at 59 (“[m]oreover, parties may not obtain consent
decrees that require action in violation of the statute under which the case was
brought or is otherwise unlawful.”) (citing Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 526).
42. United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1085–86
(1st Cir. 1994). Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice has promulgated
regulations for its management of consent decrees to resolve claims involving the
release of pollutants. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2019); 28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2019). See also
25 C.F.R. § 584.10 (2020) (Indian Gaming Commission). These regulations
simply memorialize the Department’s prior policy that assured public hearings
and transparency for consent decrees entered under early iterations of the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and other federal environmental statutes in effect
during the early 1970s.
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When reviewing a district court’s decision to enter a consent decree, an
appellate court will only reverse for a manifest abuse of discretion.43 In doing
so, the reviewing courts have noted the hallmarks of consent decrees that
affect their interpretation, modification, enforcement, and termination. For
example, the modification or termination of settlement agreements may
depend on the parties’ intent as reflected in the language of the agreement, but
the modification of consent decrees, due to their dual nature, is subject to the
same standards as final judgments.44
Other features of consent decrees suit them to regulatory settlements.
Most notably, they offer an expanded set of enforcement options when a party
fails to comply with the decree. For example, a consent decree will offer a
private litigant the opportunity to enforce its terms against the United States
or other governmental entities without surmounting sovereign immunity
defenses or equitable doctrines.45 The parties to a consent decree can also
invoke the court’s civil and criminal powers to enforce the judgment,
including requests to hold the non-compliant party in contempt.46 The court
will also exercise continuing jurisdiction over the agreement that assures
continuity of oversight and consistency of legal determinations.47 Last,
consent decrees will also frequently contain stipulated penalties, damages
43. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d at 1085; City of Bangor v.
Citizens Communications Co., 532 F.3d 70, 93–94 (1st Cir. 2008). A reviewing
court may use a more stringent standard if the trial court’s decision on a consent
decree effectively functions as the issuance of interim injunctive relief. Carson v.
American Brands, 450 U.S. 79, 86–90 (1981) (granting review of district court’s
refusal to enter consent decree as functional equivalent of injunctive relief
reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1253); Abbott v Perez, 138 S.Ct. 2305, 2319 (2018).
The appellate court will review de novo a district court’s findings of law
underlying its entry of a consent decree, particularly on constitutional issues.
United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing de
novo district court finding that EPA lacked jurisdictional authority under the
federal Commerce Clause to enter into consent decree on CERCLA site located
wholly intrastate).
44. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) (affirming the flexible
approach to modification of consent decrees emphasized in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992)); Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381 (adopting a
flexible approach to modification of consent decrees based on “[t]he experience
of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals in implementing and modifying such
decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving
the goals of reform litigation”); see also United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist., No. 88-1886, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142552, at *85 (S.D. Fla. March 31,
2010) (citing Horne for the standards of modification of consent decrees under
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) in the context of environmental permitting for construction
in the Everglades).
45. Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and
Administrative Law, 39 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 191, 199–200 n.47 (2015).
46. Id. at 200.
47. Id.
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determinations, or waivers of objections to enforcement options that make the
selection and implementation of enforcement more predictable and less
contentious.48
Governmental litigants bring additional values and desires to settlements
that use consent decrees. Given the large number of claims that they may
face, agencies or governmental defendants will likely place a high premium
on regularity and consistency. These drives lead to several important facets
of consent decree negotiations, including the wide use of model consent
decrees or standardized terms.49 Outside of formalized settlement language,
federal and state litigants have also used guidance documents and policy
directives to constrain the negotiation and content of consent decrees. For
example, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”),50 the EPA,51 and the U.S.
Department of the Interior52 have each recently issued guidance to limit the
entry of consent decrees if they pre-commit the government to regulatory
actions without broader public participation and democratic input.
Given their large institutional role, consent decrees have unsurprisingly
sparked fierce controversy. The criticisms arise in part from concerns that
these decrees can allow colluding parties to pre-commit the government to a
course of action.53 This lock-in effect arguably frustrates the democratic
48. See Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreement
and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 283
(2010).
49. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency model consent decrees
listed infra at note 73
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY
GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS TO HEADS OF CIVIL LITIGATION COMPONENTS OF U.S.
ATTORNEYS, PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVIL CONSENT DECREES AND
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
(2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1109681/download
[https://perma.cc/s7ky-fscd]. This policy extended a prior DOJ guidance that
Attorney General Edwin Meese issued in 1986 which prohibited departments and
agencies from entering into consent decrees that required the promulgation or
revision of regulations. Timothy Jost, The Attorney General’s Policy on Consent
Decrees and Settlements Agreements, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 101–102 (1987).
For a lengthy and well-reasoned response to concerns raised by the Meese
guidance, see OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENTER SETTLEMENTS LIMITING THE
FUTURE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH DISCRETION (1999),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1999/06/31/op-olc-v023p0126_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFJ6-2RYZ].
51. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DIRECTIVE PROMOTING
TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CONSENT DECREES AND
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS (2017).
52. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3368, PROMOTING
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONSENT DECREES AND SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS, (2018).
53. See supra notes 50–52.
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process if a future administration wishes to pursue a different policy course.54
Consent decrees also purportedly entangle the judicial branch in decisions that
do not always benefit from a full adversarial testing or a thorough analysis of
their underlying legal claims. These features have led to a rising critique that
“sue and settle” consent decrees unduly enlarge judicial participation and
control of the political process, and these concerns in turn have spurred
recurring legislative proposals to curb their use.55 This Article, however, does
not focus on environmental consent decrees to compel governmental
rulemaking, but instead centers on actions against parties to compel
compliance with environmental regulations or to collect costs and fees
incurred during environmental response actions.
The development of U.S. environmental law, in particular, has relied on
consent decrees. While consent decrees have played a role in environmental
litigation from its earliest days in the United States,56 they rose to prominence
in environmental lawsuits after the beginning of the modern federal
environmental era. After Congress promulgated the landmark environmental
54. See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN Government (Yale U. Press 2014).
55. See, e.g., Janette L. Ferguson & Laura Granier, Sue and Settle: Citizen
Suit Settlements and Environmental Law, 30 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 23, 23–
24 (2015); Henry N. Butler & Nathaniel J. Harris, Sue, Settle, and Shut Out the
States: Destroying the Environmental Benefits of Cooperative Federalism, 37
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 579 (2014); Stephen M. Johnson, Sue and Settle:
Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 891, 892–895
(2014).
56. For example, one seminal case of federal environmental nuisance law –
the dispute between Illinois and Missouri over the City of Chicago’s sewage
discharges into the Mississippi River and, later, the excessive withdrawal of water
from Lake Michigan – was resolved through a consent decree in 1967 that
continues in effect today. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967). Several state
attorneys general sought to invoke the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the
decree thirty-five years later by suing to force federal action against potential
incursions of invasive Asian carp into the Great Lakes. Brief for the United States
in Opposition, Wisconsin v. Illinois, (2010) (No. 1, 2, 3) (citing Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967), and earlier public nuisance litigation a century
earlier between the states over alleged cholera caused by Chicago’s sewer
discharges, Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)). Other keystone
environmental rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court on interstate torts also resulted
in consent decrees implemented under judicial supervision. The Court’s role
arose, in part, from its historical original compulsory jurisdiction over interstate
disputes (which included tort lawsuits over interstate resources, such as rivers and
airsheds) and the need for continuing judicial supervision to implement
environmental remedies that required long periods of time to accomplish. See
generally KIMBERLY K. SMITH, THE CONSERVATION CONSTITUTION (U. Kansas
Press 2019); Dand Farber, The Pro-Environment Lochner Court, LEGAL PLANET
(Sept. 30, 2019) https://legal-planet.org/2019/09/30/the-supreme-court-and-theenvironment-in-the-lochner-era [https://perma.cc/T6UE-5FFX].
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statutes in the 1970s through early 1980s, which remain the bedrock of
modern U.S. environmental law, litigation initiated under the new laws
frequently resulted in consent decrees that drove subsequent regulatory
standards and practices. For example, the genesis of the Clean Air Act’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program (“PSD”) and the Clean Water
Act’s regulation of toxic water pollutants resulted from consent decrees that
compelled action by EPA under judicial supervision.57
This practice continues in environmental law today. By one rough count,
over fourteen percent of all federal environmental lawsuits filed since 1987
have been resolved through consent, and this share climbs to over ninety
percent if one excludes environmental cases otherwise resolved by settlement
or voluntary dismissal.58 While this level of use reflects the flexibility and
procedural advantages of consent decrees,59 many parties – including the
57. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 1117, 1127–
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (litigation under federal Clean Water Act resulting in
Flannery consent decree, which required EPA to implement new water toxics
regulatory program to advance the purposes of the statute); Percival, supra note 1
at 339.
58. The Federal Judicial Center’s database tracking the resolution of federal
civil litigation since 1987 shows that parties filed 33,485 environmental cases in
all federal circuits. Of those cases, 4,827 were resolved by consent (14.4%). This
subset excludes cases resolved by settlement or voluntary dismissal, which
receive a separate tracking code. By comparisons, only 4996 cases reached
substantive resolution by trials, motions before trial, jury verdicts, directed
verdicts, and remands to agencies during that same time period. The FJC database
is available at https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/interactive/IDB-civil-since-1988
[https://perma.cc/NU8U-9PH7].
Outside of environmental law, other legal fields see even higher levels of consent
decree use. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission resolved 84.4% of
its cases in 2017 by consent decree, which can be found at
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation_reports/17annrpt.cfm#_Toc248558714
[https://perma.cc/P2HY-R859] at III(D)(1). The Federal Trade Commission
resolved 80% of its antitrust actions by consent judgments, and the U.S.
Department of Justice resolves a “vast majority” of its civil antitrust cases via
consent decrees. Robert Khuzami, Testimony on Examining the Settlement
Practices
of
U.S.
Financial
Regulators
(May
17,
2012),
https://ww.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012-ts051712rkhtm
[https://perma.cc/42CX-JGEG] (citing U.S. EEOC, Office of the General Counsel
Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report, at 62 (2009); U.S. FTC, The FTC in 2010, at 2
(2010); John M. Nannes, Termination, Modification, and Enforcement of
Antitrust Consent Decrees, 15 ANTITRUST 55, 55 (2000)).
59. Consent decrees’ reliance on contractually negotiated terms between the
parties offers the benefits of judicial oversight and enforcement, and the terms and
implementation of these decrees can be more flexible and certain than either
private settlement contracts or fully contested judgments. These advantages apply
with equal force to environmental consent decrees. See discussion supra notes
45–52; see also Brandt & Rave, supra note 32, at 88–98 (advantages to “repeat
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federal government – also routinely use them because underlying federal
statutes, regulations, and policies either recommend or bluntly mandate their
use.60 For example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) requires that settlements with
the government specifying permanent remedy selections at cleanup sites must
be lodged with the court through a consent decree.61 The statute adds several
specific substantive requirements for consent decrees as well, including
restrictions on the use of covenants not to sue and the preclusive effects of
consent settlements on contribution claims by other private cost recovery
claimants or potentially responsible parties.62
In addition to constraining consent decree terms and establishing procedural mandates for their entry, the federal government has pursued strategic
enforcement initiatives to establish new environmental obligations and
industry practices through the strategic use of consent decrees. For example,
the EPA historically selected programmatic enforcement priorities that, in the
past, have targeted industrial sectors which allegedly posed special risks of
non-compliance or environmental risks.63 These initiatives often led to
settlement strategies wherein a series of consent decrees would establish
expected language and compliance obligations for subsequent litigants or
future enforcement targets in the same sector.64 This tactic, for example,
underlaid the broad New Source Review enforcement initiative pursued by
the EPA and DOJ to reduce purportedly unpermitted air emissions from coalfired electric generation units, petroleum refineries, and mining operations.65

III. CONSENT DECREES AS A SOURCE OF LAW
If consent decrees can generate new principles of environmental law,
how do they do it? Given the wide and varied use of consent decrees in environmental disputes, they unsurprisingly use similarly broad and distinctive
pathways to influence and create environmental legal principles. Three in
players” in multidistrict litigation by relying on terms and expertise drawn from
prior consent decree and settlement negotiations).
60. See discussion supra at note 6.
61. See CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(e)(2), 9621(f)(2), 9622(e)(1), 9621(d), 9622(e)(6),
9622(f)(1)(C), 9622(g)(4), 9622(i)(3), 9622(l), 9622(m).
63. See, Consent Decree, United States v. Kern Oil & Refining Co. (No. 2:19cv-02460-KJM-CKD, E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2019) at ¶¶ 19–20,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decree/file/1224896/download
[https://perma.cc/K5ZH-AF48].
64. Consent Decree, United States v. Tesoro Refining and Marketing
Company LLC (No. SA-16-cv-00722, W.D. Tex., July 28, 2016) at 74-77,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-07/documents/tesoro-cd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6EY-YH58].
65. See discussion infra notes 80–85 (consent decrees arising from EPA
enforcement initiatives against refineries and power plants).
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particular stand out: (1) the content of consent decrees may result in changes
to expected standards of care or regulatory compliance obligations from a
substantive perspective, (2) the process of judicial review required to lodge
consent decrees may generate corollary court decisions that contain implicit
or explicit legal findings and principles, and – most controversially – (3) the
nature of consent decrees themselves as judicial instruments may inherently
offer the possibility of creating persuasive, or even precedential, legal
holdings through the cumulative content of the decrees. This list is not meant
to be exclusive, and consent decrees and agreements in other fora may
generate environmental legal principles through additional means in narrower
circumstances.66
Identifying this typology of consent decree holdings has grown much
easier thanks to the recent development of new collections and search services
that have made consent decrees readily available to the public. Historically,
the federal court system did not routinely designate consent decrees for
publication (except occasionally judgments that lodged the underlying
consent decrees), and researchers needed to either obtain court files, submit
requests under the Freedom of Information Act, or seek underlying documents
from the parties themselves.67 As a result, basic data – such as a
comprehensive set of consent decrees or judgments for a particular subject
area, or even the total number of consent decrees entered by a particular court
or in a particular subject – were typically hard to locate. Given that the
historical provenance of some consent decrees stretches back decades, vintage
consent decrees can still prove difficult to identify and assess.
The rise of computerized databases and research services has made it
much easier to assess consent decrees lodged by the federal courts since

66. For example, consent administrative orders and other consensual
administrative settlements may provide a basis to allege administrative res
judicata or collateral estoppel for issues fully contested in the agency proceeding.
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 420–22 (1966); see
also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (discussing precedential value of
administrative consent orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission). As noted
earlier, this article will not focus on the legal precedential weight of administrative
consent judgments. See discussion supra note 12.
67. The Trump Administration’s recent executive order to promote
transparency in consent decree usage arose, in part, from concerns that executive
branch agencies had failed to provide sufficient transparency and access as
dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information
Act. Section One (Policy), Executive Order on Promoting the Rule of Law
Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and
Adjudication
(Oct.
9,
2019),
available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-promotingrule-law-transparency-fairness-civil-administrative-enforcement-adjudication/.
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1980.68 These resources can sometimes include state environmental consent
decrees, but their coverage focuses predominantly on federal environmental
cases.69 Last, the federal government has begun to catalog new consent
decrees, log them into searchable databases, and provide notice to the public
about the availability of these resources.70 These new resources, however,
have only begun to collect substantial numbers of new and prior consent
decrees and include only a portion of the historical universe of consent
decrees.

68. Despite the lack of a comprehensive resource for environmental consent
decrees, several partial compilations offer a substantial collection for initial
research work. These include the Environmental Law Institute’s comprehensive
database of environmental consent decrees, orders, agreements, and judgments
dating to 1970, the LEXIS database for Environmental Consent Decrees dating to
1970, and the online compilation of consent decrees for the EPA, which provides
settlements dating from 1998. See “Consent Decree,” THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
REPORTER,
https://elr.info/search_keywords?keyword=consent+decree
&search_topic=All&x=0&y=0 [https://perma.cc/KF6M-DUGL ] (last visited
June. 17, 2020); “Consent Decree,” LEXIS ADVANCE RESEARCH,
https://advance.lexis.com/search/ [] (last visited June 17, 2020); “Consent
Decree,” EPA, https://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases/ [https://perma.cc/388ATQYN] (last visited June 17, 2020); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED
CONSENT DECREES, https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decrees (last visited
June 17, 2020). Bloomberg also now offers one of the best database resources for
searching court dockets that contain consent decrees, and in many cases the text
of
the
decrees
themselves.
See
BLOOMBERG
LAW,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/ (last visited June 17, 2020). While
numerous other services provide databases that include environmental consent
decrees, their coverage is not as broad and their search functions were not as well
suited for this research. Westlaw, for example, does not provide a specific data
field to note when a legal document is a consent decree. The Government Printing
Office website that publishes the Federal Register also does not offer a ready
means to search for consent decrees other than Boolean logic searches through its
entire database, which only reaches back to the mid-1990s. The Superfund
Information Network, which previously provided a private database for use by
industry parties negotiating consent decrees with the federal government, is
apparently defunct and cannot be accessed online via a public search.
69. State law consent decrees pose greater challenges to researchers seeking
to locate and collect authoritative compilations of prior decrees because of the
large number of states, varying bodies of law, unique court procedural
requirements and processes, and disparate reporting systems and archival
resources. As noted earlier, this article will not attempt to include state law
environment consent decrees in its analysis. See discussion supra note 5.
70. See discussion supra notes 2–3.
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A. Creation Through Fostering Substantive Norms
While each consent decree results from the individual circumstances of
its underlying litigation and preferences of particular litigants, many look
startlingly similar. This aura of repetition is not surprising because litigants
and courts will frequently turn to prior decrees to use as templates for
subsequent settlements, which helps to reduce risks that courts will reject
decrees that use novel terms or approaches.71 This practice promotes other
values as well, including consistency between case resolutions to assure
fairness and stability.
The tendency to use repetitive terminology and settlement structures is
especially pronounced with institutional litigants who face multiple lawsuits
that either challenge or enforce similar policies and laws. For large institutional players (or small coalitions of similarly positioned litigants with
common interests), the use of parallel language in multiple consent decrees
helps assure fairness in resolutions, promotes consistency in interpretations,
and avoids duplicative negotiations over repetitive terms.72 This dynamic
plays an especially important role with governmental litigants. The EPA, for
example, has issued model consent decrees that contain specific terms and
language that the agency expects in certain types of CERCLA settlements.73
71. See Brandt & Rave, supra note 32 at 93–98 (advantages to “repeat
players” in multidistrict litigation by relying on terms and expertise drawn from
prior consent decree and settlement negotiations).
72. For example, the Superfund Information Network explicitly aimed to
maximize these advantages for a coalition of large CERCLA potentially
responsible parties. See discussion supra at note 59; see also Brandt & Rave,
supra note 32, at 93–98 (advantages to “repeat players” in multidistrict litigation
by relying on terms and expertise drawn from prior consent decree and settlement
negotiations).
73. .S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, CASHOUT CONSENT DECREE FOR
ABILITY TO PAY PERIPHERAL PARTIES (CERCLA § 107) (2016),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=386
[https://perma.cc/ZF4E-3SKM]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, CASHOUT
CONSENT DECREE FOR PERIPHERAL PARTY SETTLEMENTS NOT BASED ON
ABILITY
TO
PAY
(CERCLA
§
107)
(2016),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=542
[https://perma.cc/UB44-5BAT]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, CONSENT
DECREE FOR RECOVERY OF PAST RESPONSE COSTS (CERCLA § 107) (2017),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=385
[https://perma.cc/X8D5-YY2U]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, DE MINIMIS
CONTRIBUTOR CONSENT DECREE (CERCLA § 122(G)(4)) (2016),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=538
[https://perma.cc/B4JA-FF4A]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, DE MINIMIS
LANDOWNER CONSENT DECREE (CERCLA § 122(G)(4)) (2016),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=540;
[https://perma.cc/KD5Q-5VQV]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE GENERATOR/TRANSPORTER CONSENT DECREE (2016),
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While the DOJ has not promulgated model consent decrees for public
comment or use, its internal guidelines set certain substantive requirements
for its attorneys to include in consent decrees.74 Other federal agencies with
jurisdiction over environmental concerns or natural resources deploy consent
decrees in a fashion similar to the EPA.75
The echoes of language between different consent decrees can also arise
when governmental litigants seek strategic enforcement initiatives that pursue
similar violations within a specific industrial sector. These strategic
enforcement programs often explicitly seek to spur broad changes in behavior
across an entire field of activity, and as a result, the federal government will
often seek to harmonize its settlements to assure consistent and reinforcing
actions by multiple settling parties. The EPA, in particular, has historically
pursued strategic enforcement initiatives that target specific industrial sectors
for general categories of potential environmental violations.76 These
enforcement efforts, for example, have previously focused on possible
environmental violations by coal-fired electrical power generators, petroleum

https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=541
[https://perma.cc/87ZD-H2KQ]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, NONEXEMPT DE MICROMIS PARTY CONSENT DECREE (CERCLA § 122(G)(4)) (2016),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=513
[https://perma.cc/97NZ-55WR]; U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, RD/RA
CONSENT
DECREE
(2019),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/models/view.cfm?model_ID=81
[https://perma.cc/TP4Z-UWKZ].
74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-18.200 (2018)
(confidentiality provisions in consent decrees); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
MANUAL § 3-8.130 (2018) (negotiated consent decrees terms cannot obligate
United States to expend funds in a fashion that would violate Anti-Deficiency
Act); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-3.410 (2018) (prohibition on
confidential settlements); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 5-12.613
(2018) (general requirements for negotiated terms in environmental consent
decrees).
75. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
within the U.S. Department of Commerce uses consent decrees in a broad and
systemic fashion to resolve natural resource damages claims. U.S. NAT’L
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATURAL RESOURCE CONSENT
DECREES/SETTLEMENTS
(last
visited
June
18,
2020),
https://www.gc.noaa.gov/natural-office1.html [https://perma.cc/KBY9-SP6L].
76. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA ANNOUNCES
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES FOR COMING YEARS (2016),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/epa-announces-national-enforcementinitiatives-coming-years.html
[https://perma.cc/2Z85-AFZL]
(announcing
national enforcement initiatives in industrial water pollution, accidental releases
at industrial and chemical facilities, hazardous air pollutants, large source air
pollution, energy extraction activities, contaminated storm water and sewage
discharges, and animal waste water pollution).
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refiners, mining operations, municipal wastewater and stormwater systems,
and many others.77
Given the broader range of relief available in enforcement settlements
and consent decrees,78 and the opportunities to leverage consistent changes
through consistent use of settlement terms in numerous consent decrees within
a single commercial sector or geographic community,79 consent decrees have
unsurprisingly acted as a test bed for institutional players, including
government agencies, to implement emerging technologies or pending regulatory standards in advance of binding legislative or regulatory requirements.80
For example, the EPA in the past has used consent decrees to seek controls on
refinery flares that mirrored proposed – but not yet final – regulations,81 to
institute remote sensing at refineries and other facilities that went beyond
continuous emission monitoring standards in existing regulations,82 and to
77. U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-compliance-initiatives
[https://perma.cc/DQW3-ZKWP] (last visited June 19, 2020). Recently EPA has
recast its strategic enforcement priorities as national compliance initiatives which
focus on promoting compliance as well as enforcement. The most recent National
Compliance Initiative prioritizes efforts to control emissions of volatile organic
compounds and hazardous air pollutants from stationary facilities near vulnerable
communities (particularly in non-attainment areas), prevent unpermitted
hazardous air emissions from hazardous waste facilities, reduce risks of accidental
releases from industrial and chemical facilities, assure compliance with drinking
water standards, and manage lead exposure. U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY,
FY2020-FY2023
NATIONAL
COMPLIANCE
INITIATIVES
(2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/documents/20202023ncimemo.pdf.
78. See discussion supra notes 40–41.
79. See Brandt & Rave, supra note 32 at 89–91.
80. The influence can run both ways. The entry of a consent decree may spur
the initiation of new regulatory standards or influence the development of a
nascent regulation. Environmental litigation and consent decree negotiations can
take years to complete, and federal agencies typically need just as much time to
move a complex environmental rule through the regulatory development process.
The lengthy overlap of the two processes allows each of them to potentially
influence the other.
81. Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries, 73 Fed. Reg. 35838,
35845–50, 35855 (June 24, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (noting that many
refineries had already installed many control devices required by Subpart Ja
through their prior consent decree commitments).
82. For example, the United States has persistently sought to require infrared
remote sensing of volatile organic compounds as either a compliance condition or
a supplemental environmental project in refinery consent decrees. See, e.g.,
Consent Decree, United States v. Kern Oil & Refining Co. (No. 2:19-cv-02460KJM-CKD,
E.D.
Cal.
Dec.
19,
2019)
at
¶¶
19–20,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decree/file/1224896/download; Consent
Decree, United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (No. 16-C-10484, N.D. Il., Nov.
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mandate controls on greenhouse gas emissions that contemporaneous EPA
regulations did not yet regulate.83 Specifically, the EPA has sought to
establish enhanced leak detection and repair (“LDAR”) practices and
refineries and other sectors predominantly through consent decrees,84 while
state agencies have proposed model rules for enhanced monitoring at
petroleum refineries.
While these settlements did not purport to establish binding regulatory
standards on third parties who were not included within the consent decree,

10,
2016)
at
¶¶ 51,
53–58
and
App.
C,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201611/documents/citgopetroleumcorp-pdfmidwestrefiningllc-cd.pdf. The United
States has pursued other innovative remote sensing technologies in different
industry sectors as well. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Indiana
Harbor Coke Co. (No. 18-cv-35, N.D. Ind., Jan. 25, 2018), at ¶ 30, App. 2
(requiring use of solar occultation flux for remote detection of volatile organic
compounds),
https://elr.info/sites/default/files/doj-consentdecrees/indiana_harbor.pdf. All of DOJ’s lodged environmental consent decrees
are available at THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, DOJ Proposed Consent
Decrees (last visited June 19, 2020), https://elr.info/doj-proposed-consentdecrees.
83. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Tesoro Refining and
Marketing Company LLC (No. SA-16-cv-00722, W.D. Tex., July 28, 2016) at
74–77, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-07/documents/tesorocd.pdf (flare combustion efficiency requirements); U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION
AGENCY, U.S. REFINERS TO REDUCE AT SIX REFINERIES UNDER SETTLEMENT
EPA
AND
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE
(2016),
WITH
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/oil-refiners-reduce-air-pollution-sixrefineries-under-settlement-epa-and-department.html [https://perma.cc/QTC99PTK] (consent decree requires reduction of “equivalent of 47,034 tons of carbon
dioxide”).
84. See, e.g., Appendix A to Consent Decree, United States v. Lima Refining
Co. (No. 3:17-cv-01320, W.D. Ohio, June 22, 2017) at 134–149 (“Enhanced
LDAR
Program”),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2017/06/29/env_en
forcement-2668745-v1-lodged_consent_decree.pdf; see also Inaas Durratt,
Enhanced LDAR in the Chemical Industry, TRINITY CONSULTANTS (April 6,
2010), https://www.trinityconsultants.com/news/federal/enhanced-ldar-in-thechemical-industry [https://perma.cc/2VSM-2CMU] (“[a]s a result of recent leak
detection and repair (LDAR) audits and the associated issues. . ., EPA is initiating
enhanced LDAR programs as part of the most recent consent decrees.”); MidAtlantic Regional Air Management Association (MARAMA), Model Rule for
Enhanced Monitoring of Equipment Leaks at Petroleum Refineries at p. 1 (Oct.
13, 2006) (MARAMA Technical Oversight Committee drew proposed rule
language from most stringent limits contained in recent consent decrees),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/marama.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/04184813/Refinery_Enhanced_Leak_Monitoring_Mod
el_Rule-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAH6-MH4F].
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they nonetheless established an expectation that future consent decrees would
include similar, or more stringent, terms.85 This dynamic gained further
strength when many of these emerging practices required under consent
decree matured into regulatory standards supported by data and successful
precedents established in part through consent decrees.86 Similar patterns
85. This interplay particularly stands out in CERCLA settlement negotiations
where parties, including the United States, will encourage early settlements by
raising the specter of disproportionate shares of liability to recalcitrant parties who
settle late or unsuccessfully litigate. This approach relies in part on CERCLA’s
reliance in most circumstances on joint and several liability when a party has
contributed to an indivisible harm. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 610–15 (2009) (outlining principles for establishing
divisibility and joint and several liability under CERCLA); Lynnette
Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27
LAND & WATER L. REV. 83, 100 (1993); Michael Hickok & Joyce Padleschat,
Strategic Considerations in Defending and Settling a Superfund Case, 19 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1231–32 (1986) (reservation on joint and several liability to
recalcitrant CERCLA settlors). EPA has invoked a similar settlement strategy,
however, with industry sector enforcement initiatives where it will offer more
favorable terms to the first industry members who settle and reserve harsher
conditions for late settlors.
86. The federal government’s prior enforcement practices are replete with
strategic sector initiatives designed to create quasi-regulatory impacts. For
example, EPA and DOJ have sought to enhance emission control obligations at
refineries through consent decrees that effectively equaled control requirements
under its pending proposed regulations for refinery emissions under 40 C.F.R.
Subpart Ja. See e.g., United States v. Marathon Petroleum Company, LP, et al.
(No.
1:12-cv-11544,
E.D.
Mich.,
June
9,
2016)
at
3–4,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/865816/download (amending an existing
consent decree to satisfy emission requirements under a forthcoming rule that “in
part as a result of knowledge and data arising out of the negotiation and
implementation of the flare efficiency requirements of the Consent Decree, EPA
recently finalized a new, industry-wide rule for flare controls as part of EPA’s
Petroleum Refinery Sector Risk and Technology Review Rule . . . .”). Consent
decrees under CERCLA that direct remedial actions at contaminated sites have
long contained standardized language drawn from model consent decrees which
effectively impose quasi-regulatory standards on remedy selection and cleanup
operations. See U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, ISSUANCE OF REVISED MODEL
CONSENT ORDER AND NEW MODEL UNILATERAL ORDER FOR REMEDIAL
INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY AND UPDATED FINANCIAL ASSURANCE AND
INSURANCE LANGUAGE FOR ALL CERCLA RESPONSE ACTION SETTLEMENTS AND
UNILATERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDERS
(2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/rifs-asaoc-uaomods-mem-2016_0.pdf. Similarly, consent decree settlements under the federal
Clean Water Act have effectively driven the development of treatment standards
for contaminated sediments under its Total Maximum Daily Load standards. See
e.g., Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Preliminary Notice of Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) Development for the Chesapeake Bay, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,792,
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surface as well in administrative settlements, supplemental environmental
projects, and consent decrees negotiated under other parallel principles such
as environmental mitigation demands by the DOJ, but the judicial
ensconcement of these emerging practices in formal court decrees gives them
added heft and persistence.87 In addition to laying baselines for future
regulatory requirements, consent decrees that require operators in a specific
economic sector to adopt specific corrective practices may also effectively
influence the standard of care required by tort law,88 regulatory safety,89 and
the selection of specific technology standards under environmental laws.90

47,792–94 (Sept. 17, 2009) (public notice and initial request for public input,
citing “the intent of EPA to establish a Chesapeake Bay-wide Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) for nutrients and sediment for all impaired segments in the
tidal portion of the Chesapeake Bay watershed” whereby the “TMDL is being
developed consistent with the requirements of two Consent Decrees . . . .”). This
long history of this practice reaches back to some of the earliest consent decrees
that helped establish fundamental federal environmental programs. For example,
the Flannery Consent Decree that initially established discharge standards for
toxic water pollutants under the federal Clean Water Act ultimately became the
basis for statutory revisions by Congress in 1977. Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Train, Civ. No. 2153-73, 6 ENVTL L. RPTR. 20,588 (D.D.C. 1976)
(lodging of Flannery consent decree); U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, TOXIC
AND PRIORITY POLLUTANTS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT (last visited June 20,
2020), https://www.epa.gov/eg/toxic-and-priority-pollutants-under-clean-wateract [https://perma.cc/TQ2S-KMC2]; 42 U.S.C. § 7470 et al.
87. As noted earlier, parties wishing to modify a consent decree must meet
higher standards than the simple mutual agreement needed to alter a contractual
settlement agreement. See supra text accompanying note 44. The relative weight
of a consent decree likely will also grow if a court reviews public comments or
third-party submissions by convening a hearing on entry of the decree, or if the
decree has been in place long enough to bolster the reliance interests of the parties
or other individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 42.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTION HARM §§ 13, 14, 16 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (role of custom and statutory
compliance in determining negligence); David Owen, The Five Elements of
Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1678 (2007); Richard Epstein, The Path
to “The T. J. Hooper”: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21
J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1992).
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 1902.1 et. seq. (numerous regulatory safety standards
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)).
90. See Clean Air Act § 112(r), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(r) (2018) (“Prevention of
Accidental Releases,” requiring that EPA establish emission standards that
require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of hazardous air
pollutants); §§ 165(a)(4), 169(3). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (2018)
(establishing “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) regulating major new
sources and modifications in attainment areas under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program); § 112(d), 42, U.S.C. 7412(d) (2018) (establishing
“Maximum Achievable Control Technology” (MACT) regulating sources of
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Using consent decrees and settlements to effectuate new or emerging
standards is, of course, controversial and raises important questions about
transparency and democratic accountability. Recent legislative and policy
initiatives to constrain settlements do not address this particular pathway for
evolving environmental legal standards. For example, while recent DOJ and
EPA guidances91 forbid consent decrees that impair the discretion of future
administrations to set regulatory policy, these guidances focus on regulatory
settlements that compel the agency to issue formal rules of national scope
within certain timeframes or with mandated content.92 By contrast, the
consent decree terms discussed above deal solely with individual parties who
reach an agreement to their specific controversy and, generally, address
retrospective applications of law. Any standards created by a constellation of
consent decrees are essentially organic and emerge, in a common law-like
fashion, from the full sphere of settlement terms. These consent decrees also
generally do not fall afoul of other objections to supplemental environmental
projects or citizen suit settlements which involve payments to third parties or
provision of funds for agency use without congressional appropriation.93
EPA has historically sought to avoid using its enforcement powers to
create or implement new environmental norms that lack any underlying
regulatory or statutory standards, but it has not noted any such reservations in
its use of its settlement authority.94 This informal practice has generally, not
hazardous air pollutants under NESHAP); §§ 173(a)(2) and 171(3), 42 U.S.C. §§
7503(a)(2), 7501(1) (2018) (establishing the “Lowest Achievable Emission Rate”
(LAER) regulating major new sources and modifications in nonattainment areas
under the Nonattainment New Source Review (NNSR) program); see also 33
U.S.C. §§ 1316(a)-(b) (2018) (establishing “Best Available Demonstrated
Technology” (BADT), sometimes alternatively called the “New Source
Performance Standards” (NSPS), for regulating new dischargers under the CWA);
40 C.F.R. § 268 (2019) (establishing Land Disposal Restrictions (LDRs) for
hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)).
91. An agency guidance is a statement of agency policy or interpretation
concerning a statute, regulation, or technical matter within the agency’s
jurisdiction that the agency intends to have general applicability and affect
regulated parties’ future behavior. Such guidances, however, do not have force
or effect of law in their own right. 36 U.S.C. § 1213.2(a) (National Archives and
Records Administration’s definition of “guidance”).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48.
93. Memorandum from J. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, to ENRD Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Settlement
Payments to Third Parties in ENRD Cases (Jan. 9, 2018), available at
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1043726/download .
94. SEP Guidance at 6–7 (noting restriction that SEPs in settlements must not
duplicate existing legal requirements or obligations under injunctions or consent
decrees); see also John Graham & James Broughel, Stealth Regulation:
Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1
HARV. J.L. & PUBLIC POL’Y: FEDERALIST 30, 46–47 (2014) (noting that federal
agencies create policy by exercise of enforcement discretion, and that the Office
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substantively, restricted the flexibility of parties to voluntarily assume
additional obligations as part of a settlement offer or resolution, and it
ultimately does not change the outcome. The broad implementation of the
same practices through a collection of consent decrees inevitably will shift the
legal expectations and duty of care for remaining operators and facilities in
the same sector.

B. Creation Through Deferential Judicial Review
While consent agreements can vary widely in their content and subject
matter, they all must undergo a similar review process before a federal court
will lodge them as judgments. As noted earlier, every lodged consent decree
comes with an accompanying undemanding judicial decision: that the decree
is reasonable, fair, adequate, and consistent with applicable law.95 While this
deferential standard of review preserves a large zone of autonomy to settling
parties on how they resolve their disputes, it nonetheless sets parameters
beyond which the parties cannot settle because the settlement conflicts with
the underlying statute. The legality of a consent agreement, in turn, rests on
the scope and obligations of the underlying statute, the terms and extent of
proffered remedial action, the effects on third parties, or other factors. In
making that assessment, the reviewing court must make an initial interpretation of the underlying statutes or legal rights affected by the parties’
settlement. Those interpretations consequently create law and statutory interpretations as part of the lodging process.
When analyzing the legal effect of court decisions to lodge consent
decrees, it is helpful to distinguish between two types of rulings. First, the
court may reach a legal conclusion about the validity, scope, or enforcement
of a consent decree without considering the contents of the decree itself or the
assertions made by the parties.96 These inquiries may turn on the constitutionality of the underlying statutory provision or the standing or competence
of a party to seek a judgment. For example, in United States v. Olin Corporation, the district court concluded that the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution did not provide a valid basis for the United States to regulate the
cleanup of a waste site located wholly within state boundaries.97 The court,
therefore, refused to enter a proffered consent decree that would have
governed that remedial action.98 This type of judicial ruling relies wholly on
legal conclusions outside the specific scope or contents of the decree itself,
and as a result, appellate courts will typically subject such a decision to de
novo review – the exact review standard used by the Eleventh Circuit to

of Information and Regulatory Affairs lacks the capacity and clear authority to
review consent decrees for their potential policy and regulatory implications).
95. See discussion supra notes 24–44.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F.2d 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
97. Id. at 1532–33).
98. Id.
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overturn the district court’s conclusion.99 These judgments, therefore,
generate precedential law in conventional ways with expected levels of
appellate review.
For consent decrees wholly between private parties, judicial review will
follow the baseline requirements outlined earlier, that the proffered decree
must be fair, adequate, and legal.100 The court cannot substitute its preferences or demand specific provisions in the parties’ agreement, and it will
approve a proposed consent decree even if the court would not have fashioned
the same remedy.101 This standard reflects the strong historical presumption
in favor of voluntary settlements of disputes without litigation.102
Federal courts will typically give an even more deferential review of a
settlement’s legal conclusions and assertions when a federal agency proffers
the decree. Notably, the presumption in favor of settlement is especially
powerful when the DOJ negotiates a consent settlement on behalf of a federal
agency with substantial expertise in the subject matter at issue.103 In many
respects, this deferential review functionally parallels the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review of administrative agency actions under the
federal Administrative Procedure Act.104
This relaxed review of proposed consent decrees evokes instructive
echoes of the deference that federal courts show to an agency’s interpretations
of statutes within its zone of authority and expertise.105 To some extent,
consent decrees – particularly institutional consent decrees or decrees that
involve government agencies – incorporate decisions and values directly
relevant to agency actions, including statutory interpretations, selection of
actions from alternatives, and enforcement discretion. As a result, a court’s

99. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997). The
Eleventh Circuit remanded the consent decree for further consideration in light of
its opinion. Id. at 1515; see also U.S. v. Witco, 76 F.Supp.2d 519, 529-31 (D. Del.
1999) (finding stipulated damages provision of consent decree unconstitutional
and unenforceable to extent it imposed penalties during pendency of appeal before
court). Similarly, a court will decline a consent decree, irrespective of its contents,
if it results from collusion or improper process. United States v. BP Exploration
& Oil Co., 167 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1049 (N.D. Ind.) (2001); Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 717 F.Supp. 507, 515 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24–44.
101. United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990);
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 507, 515 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
102. United States. v. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corp., 776 F.2d 410, 411
(2d Cir. 1985).
103. United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1425–
26 (6th Cir. 1991); Hooker, 776 F.2d at 411; United States v. Wisconsin Electric
Power Co., 522 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1111–1112 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2018) et seq.; id. at § 706(2) (scope of review).
105. See discussion infra note 112.
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decision to lodge a consent decree may reflect similar deference to an agency
interpretation of the statute or regulation that underlies the agreement.106
The degree of deference that a federal court should extend to agency
determinations contained within consent decrees lies outside the scope of this
analysis, but some preliminary approaches immediately suggest themselves.
First, if a court reviews consent decree terms that rely on statutory interpretations proffered by federal agencies with authority and expertise in the field,
the well-known Skidmore standard provides an appropriate degree of
deference.107 Skidmore provides that courts will give weight to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute according to its thoroughness, consistency, validity,
and “power to persuade.”108 While it leaves the ultimate determination of a
statutory or regulatory interpretation to the reviewing court, Skidmore directs
the court to give an appropriate degree of weight to the agency’s
determination.109 At least one federal appellate court has noted in dicta that a
reviewing court should offer some deference to the EPA’s statutory interpretations offered as part of a CERCLA consent decree review and lodging
process.110 Other federal courts in non-environmental cases have granted
deference to statutory interpretations contained in prior consent decrees when
reviewing later administrative actions against private parties.111
Important differences remain, and the analogy is imperfect. In particular, this rationale likely would not support an application of Chevron
deference or Auer/Seminole Rock deference to judicial review of legal
determinations contained in consent decrees with federal agencies.112 The

106. While federal courts will also give a deferential review of consent decrees
between purely private parties, that deference is less marked than decrees
involving governmental agencies, and the arguments favoring deference to their
interpretations of statutes or regulations are much less compelling. See supra text
accompanying note 88.
107. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1954).
108. Id. at 140; see also Kristin Hickman & Matthew Krueger, In Search of
the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1240–41 (2007).
109. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40.
110. Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1013 n.6 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“[w]hile the courts of appeals agree that the EPA is afforded significant deference
when it seeks judicial approval of a proposed CERCLA consent decree, courts
have not established whether the deference that we afford the EPA is the deference
described in [Chevron], the deference described in [Skidmore], or some other type
of deference”) (internal citations omitted).
111. See infra text accompanying note 121.
112. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). While the Chevron standard of judicial review focuses on agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language, the Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine
applies when an agency interprets ambiguous language contained in its own
regulations. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). Under Auer/Seminole Rock, the Court previously
held that the agency’s interpretation merited an even higher degree of deference
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extraordinarily rich and voluminous scholarship on Chevron resists a quick
summary, but in general, the Chevron standard of review dictates that a federal
court must defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory
language if the agency bears responsibility for implementing the statute and
has offered an interpretation that is reasonable.113 In reaching this standard,
Justice Stevens found that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language benefited from implied delegation of authority from Congress to
address the issue, a need to respect separation of powers between the judicial
and legislative branches, enhanced democratic accountability of executive
agencies charged with the statutory interpretation, and the enhanced flexibility
of the executive branch to change and adapt to future circumstances.114
None of these Chevron rationales apply squarely to an agency statutory
interpretation or legal conclusion contained in a consent decree. First, except
arguably in narrow circumstances,115 Congress typically does not expressly or
implicitly delegate power to an agency to make binding statutory interpretations via the consent decree process, even if the underlying statutory language
is ambiguous.116 Second, even with opportunities for public comment and a
fairness hearing, the process used to review and lodge federal consent decrees
is inherently outside the democratic process and not directly responsive to
elections.117 Third, the incorporation of statutory interpretations into binding
consent decrees would also make them difficult to change or adapt to evolving

in judicial review than under the Chevron standard. The Court, however, recently
limited the Auer doctrine to a narrower range of cases in a highly fractured opinion
that raises doubts about the doctrine’s viability in the future. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2423–24 (2019).
113. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45
114. Id.
115. As noted above, some federal statutes provide that agencies must enter
certain settlements and enforcement determinations as consent decrees. See supra
text accompanying notes 25–29 (CERCLA, Tunney Act, immigration). None of
these statutes specify that an agency can proffer binding statutory interpretations
through the enforcement or consent decree process, and they do not explicitly
address the degree of deference that a federal court must show to agency legal
conclusions contained in a consent decree).
116. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45, 864–66 (statutory ambiguity implies
Congressional intent to delegate authority to agency to interpret the language at
issue). This rationale has come under scholastic criticism. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 995
(1992); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 471 (1989).
117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not
part of either political branch of the Government . . . While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices.”).
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circumstances because of the demanding threshold requirements for modifying or revoking consent decree judgments.118
As a result, the flexible and non-binding review standard provided by
Skidmore seems a more logical framework to weigh the persuasive power of
legal determinations contained in consent decrees involving the federal
government.119 While the Court has noted that agency interpretations need
not undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking to qualify for Chevron
deference, it has still insisted that Congress’ statutory language reflect an
intent to delegate authority for the agency’s determinations to have “the force
of law” and “bind more than the parties to the ruling.”120 A subsequent court
examining a prior consent decree – and, by implication, the judicial decision
that lodged it – therefore would operate as if the lodging court had reviewed
any legal determinations or interpretations in the decree under the Skidmore
standard. While a judicial acceptance of an agency statutory interpretation
under Skidmore may have less persuasive or precedential value to subsequent
courts, it nonetheless would have some legal effect.121
118.See supra text accompanying note 44 (standards for modification of consent
decrees).
119. The logical fit of the Skidmore standard does not mean, however, that
other review frameworks could also apply instead. For example, if a court wished
to grant more autonomy to the parties during the settlement negotiation process
and encourage voluntary resolutions, it might instead adopt a review standard
similar to the business judgment rule familiar from corporate law. This standard
would effectively require the court to grant a safe harbor within which the parties
could choose a resolution with little, or no, approval or review from the court.
120. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001). The Court also noted
that the sheer volume and informality of the agency interpretations at issue (i.e.,
tariff classification rulings) made any attempt to categorize them as having “force
of law” as “simply self-refuting.” Id. at 233. While the federal government enters
into numerous consent decrees in multiple subject areas, those decrees come
nowhere close to the raw volume and informality of the tariff classification rulings
at issue in Mead. Id. at 238 n.19 (10,000 to 15,000 tariff rulings annually from 46
different Customs offices).
121. United States v. Coeur d’Alenes Co., 767 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 2014);
Tillman v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-4030, 2019 WL
6718985 at *4 n.4 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 10, 2019) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 200)
(“Although consent decrees are neither formal rules nor formal guidance, ‘an
agency’s interpretation of a statute may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information
available to the agency’”); United States v. Gibson Wine Co., No.
115CV01900AWISKO, 2018 WL 1305791 at *1 (E.D. Cal. March 13, 2018)
(citing Mead, 553 U.S. at 227–28) (noting that courts should pay deference to
EPA judgment to enter into CERCLA consent decree, including the agency’s
“construction of a statutory scheme”); Genova v. Total Card, Inc., 193 F. Supp.
3d 360, 368 (D.N.J. 2016) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 220; Skidmore, 232 U.S. at
134) (using judicial notice of identical language used by Federal Trade
Commission and Consumer Finance Protection Bureau consent decrees as basis
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A thought experiment can help illuminate how legal determinations in
consent decrees might shape future judicial holdings. Assume, for example,
that the EPA has entered into a series of consent decrees to resolve
enforcement actions that allege a party has failed to report releases of a certain
chemical that the EPA claims is a “pollutant” under CERCLA. While the
EPA has not taken regulatory action to formally designate the chemical as a
CERCLA pollutant, the consent decree includes allegations that the chemical
meets the statutory definition and falls into that category. To enter the
proffered decree, a federal court would only need to determine that the decree
fell within the general scope of the pleadings and met with the objectives of
the underlying statute (including a finding that the decree did not conflict with
or violate the underlying statute).122 If the court agrees to lodge the decree
and issues an opinion approving the settlement, it will normally not
independently review or second-guess the agency’s legal determination as
part of the consent decree entry process if that interpretation does not directly
conflict with the relevant statutory language.123 As a result, the lodging
court’s willingness to approve the decree could become relevant if that legal
conclusion is contested by a future litigant.124

C. Creation Through Persuasion and Precedent
While consent decrees may develop law through their recurring content
or their entry as judgments, the idea that they may directly bind or affect future
court decisions is much more controversial. In part, this reaction reflects a
fundamental inconsistency between the norms involved: the power of an
earlier judicial opinion to persuade or bind a future decision rests in part on

to defer under Skidmore to agencies’ endorsement of legal sufficiency of
disclaimer language; “Although these consent decrees are neither formal rules nor
formal guidance, ’an agency’s interpretation’ of a statute ‘may merit some
deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader
investigations and information’ available to the agency”); but see Emma C. v.
Eastin, No. 96-CV-04179-THE, 2014 WL 2989946 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d sub
nom Emma v Eastin, 673 F. App’s 637 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying Chevron,
Skidmore, and Mead’s applicability to state agency’s argument that it had legally
satisfied requirements of consent decree; court held Chevron deference does not
apply to a state agency determination, and compliance with a consent decree was
not “legislative rulemaking” that incorporated a statutory interpretation which
merited deference).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41.
123. See supra id.
124. Notably, the court’s willingness to defer to the agency’s legal
interpretation contained in the consent decree would apply even if the agency has
the discretion to change its mind in the future on the underlying legal question.
See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 566 U.S. 478, 486 (2012)
(per curiam); Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
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its reasoning and rationale, while a consent decree reflects the intent of the
settling parties without necessarily offering an explicit ratio in the naked text
of the decree. In a way, honoring a prior consent decree judgment as
persuasive or binding is like reading a contract to find a narrative explanation.
The two types of documents serve fundamentally different purposes. To
allow settling parties to consensually create judgments that affect judicial
consideration of future disputes also raises the specters of collusion,
manipulation, and loss of judicial control over the adjudicative function.
Despite these concerns, consent decrees may nonetheless generate
legally relevant rules, principles, and precedents in constrained and varying
ways. Consent judgments do not impose a uniform legally constraining effect
on future opinions in a rigid and predetermined way. Like the common law
process itself, consent judgments can affect or bind future judgments along a
spectrum of persuasion and force that turns on the individual circumstances
and history of each case. In this regard, consent decrees can have degrees of
impact that vary from persuasive effect, through the statement of useful
principles, to encapsulations of a legal rule, to binding effects of precedent
applied through stare decisis, to direct compulsory effects on parties, to the
original decree through the law of the case doctrine or judicial estoppel. In a
sense, the power of the consent judgment escalates gradually from broad yet
diffuse effect (persuasion) to tight and compulsory (preclusion, judicial
estoppel, and law of the case).
To draw useful distinctions between the varying effects of consent
decrees on subsequent judicial considerations, precision in vocabulary helps
to avoid conflation and confusion. At the lowest level, a judgment may have
persuasive value if it offers insights and relevant rules for a decision that a
future court finds wise or helpful. Persuasive prior decisions, however,
obviously have no binding effect and cannot compel deference from future
decision-makers. By contrast, a precedential opinion can require a court to
apply its holding to future litigants through the operation of stare decisis. The
force of this compulsion operates in both horizontal and vertical fashion: a
lower court must follow the relevant precedential holdings of a superior court
(vertical), while a court may constrain its decision in a current case by looking
to its prior rulings to assure consistency and fairness in reaching a similar
result for similarly positioned cases (horizontal).125 Notably, this distinction

125. This brief description of the role of precedent and stare decisis skims over
a broad and vigorous debate over the role of precedent in the evaluation of
constitutional claims or the interpretation of constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Richard Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 767 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570–71 (2001); Gary Lawson,
The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 23–
24 (1994); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 723 (1988); Charles Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent
and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 404
(1988). While this debate sheds important light on the fundamental nature of
precedent, stare decisis, and deference owed to prior judicial judgments on
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neither exerts precedential effects on sister courts at an equivalent level, nor
grants precedential power to federal district court decisions other than
horizontal deference to that court’s own prior decisions. The operation of
precedent and stare decisis has become regularized to an extent at the
appellate level in the federal judiciary through the promulgation of formal
rules by the appellant courts.126 Some federal appellate courts use these rules
to guide their discretion in choosing whether their opinions will formally have
precedential or stare decisis effect.127

1. Preclusion
For the parties who directly enter into them and lodge them with the
court, consent decree judgments function as wholly binding judicial decrees.
In this untroubling context, the lodging parties face the same preclusive and
binding effects of any other judgment issued by the court in their case. The
entry of a consent decree judgment would impose issue preclusion, res
judicata, and the law of the case consequences if they wished to relitigate their
concerns in the future.128
This sweeping statement bears some important modulations. As noted
earlier, the scope and preclusive effect of a consent judgment turns to an

similarly situated cases, the lodging of federal consent decrees rarely raises these
types of constitutional issues. But see United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506,
1509 (scope of Congressional powers under Commerce Clause to regulate wholly
in-state landfill under CERCLA).
126. Elizabeth Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 808, 816, 819–22 (2018). The Ninth Circuit has debated potential federal
Constitutional constraints on the power of courts to issue nonprecedential
opinions, but it has not reached a definitive conclusion. Compare Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds as
moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (questioning constitutionality of
nonprecedential unpublished judicial opinions) with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d
1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001); see also K. Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power,
and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2002).
127. Beske, supra note 126 at 819–20.
128. Congress can use statutes to specify the res judicata or other preclusive
effects of a consent judgment or consent decree. For example, Congress has
barred the use of a prior consent decree in an antitrust action as prima facie
evidence of wrongful conduct in a future action, but only if the court enters the
decree before any testimony has been taken. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2018); see also
15 U.S.C. § 16(h) (2018) (barring introduction of prior consent decree as prima
facie evidence against defendant when a court assesses whether settlement is in
the public interest); Michael Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535
(2000); Lawrence Marshall, Let Congress Do It: The Case for an Absolute Rule
of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989).
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important degree on the intent of the parties.129 As a result, a consent decree
may expressly stipulate that the parties do not intend to resolve or incur
preclusive effects on identified legal or factual issues. By agreeing to enter
the judgment, the lodging court presumably approves the consensual exclusion of these issues from the scope of the judgment’s binding effect. In
addition, the parties cannot subsequently modify a consent judgment simply
by mutual agreement.130 They instead need to gain the court’s permission to
modify the judgment and must meet the federal standards for modifications
of judgments as specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
additional guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court for certain public consent
decrees.131 Last, if the parties make affirmative representations to the court
on germane legal conclusions or factual statements, or if they actively litigate
disputed points on which the court issues an interim judgment to resolve,132
they may face separate legal constraints arising from the law of the case
doctrine or judicial estoppel.133
Beyond the simple preclusive effects of judgment on the parties in the
current dispute, consent decrees may also serve to establish binding rulings
on parties on factual matters outside the four corners of the decree. For
example, the entry of a consent decree may be admissible for proving facts,
such as knowledge of underlying conditions or existence of a dispute, related
to its entry. This narrow form of preclusive effect does not extend, however,

129. The parties’ intent may not solely control the preclusive scope of a
consent decree on their future claims if they potentially involve the interests of
third parties. For example, the entry of consent decrees to resolve class action
lawsuits or other aggregate litigation may involve fairness and due process
constraints that reach beyond the limited scope of the parties’ desires. See supra
text accompanying notes 21–42
130. See supra text accompanying note 44.
131. See supra id.
132. For example, a simple settlement entered as a decree with no adversarial
process, court hearing, or judicial determination of its content should not
command the same preclusive effect as a fully litigated consent decree that drew
close scrutiny from a reviewing judge during a contested fairness hearing. That
judgment, however, may still retain persuasive power based on the fairness or
wisdom of its resolution of the underlying claim.
133. In some limited circumstances, affirmative statements or concessions as
part of entry of a consent settlement may trigger legal consequences under
doctrines of judicial estoppel. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 748, 749–52
(2001) (finding that New Hampshire’s prior acceptance of state boundary in river
in a 1977 consent decree prevented it from urging a different position in a
subsequent action in 2000). The federal government, however, is not subject to
nonmutual issue preclusion effects from prior judgments. See infra text
accompanying note 173.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/6

36

Hester: Consent Decrees as Emergent Environmental Law

2020] CONSENT DECREES AS EMERGENT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

723

to the judicial endorsement of alleged facts to which the parties expressly did
not concur in the consent decree’s terms.134

2. Persuasion
Beyond their direct binding effect on the relatively small universe of
parties who personally enter into them, consent decrees also can have
persuasive value as interpretations of law when a federal court conducts a
hearing to determine the decree’s fairness and legality. For example, a federal
court might address the legality of a proffered decree at a fairness hearing or
expressly require the parties to resolve a substantive legal issue underlying the
settlement as a predicate for entry of the decree.135 While that determination
might not directly bind future third-party litigants, the court’s rationale and
conclusion to approve the decree would be available to provide helpful or
persuasive guidance to future judges wrestling with a legal issue or
considering the entry of a similar consent decree.136
The powers of persuasion usually receive far less attention in scholarly
analysis than the mechanics of precedence and stare decisis. The impact of a
non-binding decision on subsequent rulings, however, can be sweeping.
While a prior decision may not pose a binding precedent that another court
would need to distinguish or accept, it may still present a clear formulation of
134. Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc., No. CV-08-1533 RJD VVP, 2008 WL
2483288 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It is true that various cases have found
settlement agreements and consent decrees admissible to prove matters other than
the truth of the allegations that led to the settlements, including such issues as
knowledge, motive, and intent. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97
(2dCir.1981) (SEC consent decree admissible to prove knowledge of reporting
requirements); Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 157, 179–80
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (consent decree admitted to prove knowledge of employer’s
obligations under Americans with Disabilities Act); Brotman v. National Life Ins.
Co., No. 94 CV 3468, 1999 WL 33109, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1999) (motive
and credibility); United States v. Warren, No. CIV.A 7:04 CR 00021, 2005 WL
1164195, at *3–4 (W.D.Va. May 17, 2005) (knowledge of what was permissible
under securities laws); Saford v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection Dist. No.
1, No. CIV.A. 02-0055, 2003 WL 1873907, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr.11,
2003) (discriminatory intent); Johnson v. Hugo’s Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1413
(4th Cir.1992) (discriminatory motive and intent)”).
135. The federal judiciary’s long-standing preference for parsimony in the
exercise of its powers may constrain the willingness of some courts to explore
corollary issues of legality underlying the decree unless absolutely necessary.
John Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 762, 763–64 (1955)
(reviewing historical practices of judicial self-restraint and parsimony).
136. To the extent that a court gives weight to opinions from different
jurisdictions from other legal systems, states, or nations, considerations of comity
may also support a grant of persuasive weight to decisions in other jurisdictions
to enter or reject consent decrees or to note the specific terms of their consent
decrees.
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a new legal rule or principle that can guide the considerations of sister courts
outside the initial court’s ambit or scope of appellate jurisdiction. For
example, a federal district court opinion approving the entry of a CERCLA
consent decree specifying a particular technical remedy and oversight
mechanism may not bind a future review of a similar CERCLA consent decree
by another district court (or even that same district court). It would nonetheless provide relevant context for assessing the fairness and consistency of
a proffered new decree that sets out similar terms and remedial selections.
The parties to a consent decree may also rely on prior decrees for their
persuasive value during the negotiation process by pointing to prior decrees
as a baseline for terms in the proposed decree. In addition, other stakeholders
can highlight prior consent decrees in their comments or objections to a
proposed decree during the public comment process or a fairness hearing. To
some extent, this tactic has already surfaced in comments submitted on large
environmental consent decrees with governmental entities.137 The recent use
of confidentiality constraints during consent decree negotiations, however,
may constrain the ability of non-party stakeholders to emphasize persuasive
earlier consent decrees or decisions prior to a fairness hearing or lodging of
the decree.138

3. Precedent
Beyond the relatively clear case for coercively binding the parties of
consent judgments to their decrees and for giving gentler non-binding
persuasive power to consent rulings on future litigants, the prospect of consent
decrees with precedential effects on third-party litigants provokes much
sharper objections. To some extent, the pushback reflects the intense ongoing
debate about the proper role in constitutional litigation of precedence itself,
and how courts should apply the mechanics of stare decisis.139 Most of this

137. For example, when Bayou City Waterkeeper commented on the proposed
consent decree between the United States and the City of Houston to resolve
numerous alleged violations of discharge limits in the city’s Texas Pollution
Discharge Elimination System wastewater permit, the Waterkeeper expressly
pointed to terms contained in prior municipal wastewater consent decrees as
persuasive demonstrations of the need for similar terms in Houston’s consent
decree. Letter from Jordan Macha, Exec. Dir. & Kristen Schlemmer, Legal Dir.,
Bayou City Waterkeepers, to Phillip Ledbetter, Assistant Attorney Gen., Tex.
(Nov. 8, 2019) at 6 n.23 (referring to St. Louis consent decree terms), 13 n.28
(City of Atlanta consent decree), 19–21 (Louisville, Kansas City, Chicago),
https://bayoucitywaterkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/2019.11.08Comment-Letter-re-Consent-Decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/59XS-V772].
138. See, e.g., Maxine Joselow, California Uses Privacy Agreement to Shield
Talks with Automakers, ENV’T & ENERGY NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1062310669/
[https://perma.cc/576C-85S9]; see also Rice, supra note 1 at 1.
139. See discussion supra at n.105.
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debate, however, has comparatively little relevance for typical environmental
consent decrees.140
Despite fights over the outer boundaries of precedence, its core features
have remained relatively stable in common law systems for centuries.141 At
its most basic level, stare decisis refers to the obligation of a court to obey
either its prior case law (“horizontal precedence”) or the holdings of a superior
court (“vertical precedence”).142 A precedent, in turn, refers to a decision or
action in a prior case that establishes a new principle or rule which can apply
to similarly situated cases in the future.143 Stare decisis does not predetermine
the outcome of successor cases, and a court has the power either to distinguish
prior precedents in ways that limit its future power or to simply overrule its
horizontal precedents when it prove pernicious or incorrect.144

140. The heart of the controversy over the use of stare decisis in constitutional
litigation is that the U.S. Supreme Court relies on the doctrine to constrain its
ability to overturn controversial constitutional precedents. See, e.g., Brandon
Murrell, The Supreme Court’s Overruling of Constitutional Precedent, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. RPT. R45319 (2018); Michael Gerhardt, The Pressure of
Precedent: A Critique of the Conservative Approaches to Stare Decisis in
Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 67 (1993); William Consovoy, The
Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson,
and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53 (2002).
While consent decrees may tackle highly controversial subjects, they are typically
lodged by district courts or appellate courts that are clearly subject to the full force
of vertical and horizontal stare decisis.
141. By contrast, civil code legal systems have not adopted stare decisis and
do not rely on precedents in the same way as common law systems. D. NEIL
MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997); Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common
Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 419–20 (1967).
142. Stare decisis is a truncation of the full Latin maxim stare decisis et non
quieta movere, which means “stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the
calm.” James Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REV. 345, 347 (1986).
143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, precedent (11th ed. 2019) (“Precedent”
defined as “[a]n adjudged case or decision of a court of justice, considered as
furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards
arising or a similar question of law.”) (“An action or official decision that can be
used as support for later actions or decisions; esp., a decided case that furnishes a
basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues”).
144. Federal appellate courts can also limit the precedential value of their
opinions by choosing not to publish them. Depending on the appellate courts
rules, unpublished opinions can lack precedential value in future proceedings
before that same court or other courts under its appellate review. See infra text
accompanying note 126. In essence, this review process predetermines whether
the judgment will have horizontal precedential value as well as vertical precedential effect.
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The longevity and durability of precedent and stare decisis reflect the
commonsense purposes that the doctrines promote. Some of these benefits
apply to any decision-maker, such as the efficiency gained by not revisiting
basic questions that have already been decided in every new dispute,145 as well
as ensuring the humility of later decision-makers who accord respect and due
consideration to the rationales offered by earlier decision-makers.146 Other
benefits are more uniquely suited to judges and courts, such as the need to
provide equal treatment to similarly positioned claimants, predictability in the
application of laws and rules, and the discipline of providing a persuasive
rationale for a decision that can serve future jurists.147 All of these values help
promote coherence and relevance in the body of decisions that make precedent
overall a more useful and powerful tool for future litigants.
Giving prospective precedential effect to consent decrees in certain
instances might serve similar goals. For example, looking to prior consent
decrees that resolved similar disputes to guide subsequent decisions could
promote efficiency, equal treatment, and predictability in recurring litigation.
But the match is not entirely clean. The concept of humility – that current
decision-makers should respect and, when warranted, defer to prior decisionmakers as an acknowledgment of their insight and skill – may not make sense
if the prior consent decree arises mostly from the contractual resolution of a
dispute by private litigants.148 Similarly, the virtue of discipline, which arises
from a judge’s desire to craft an opinion that can guide future decisionmakers, may not play any role between purely private litigants who have no
interest in future or current disputes by other parties.
The most telling objection to granting precedential effect to consent
judgments, however, is that they typically lack a stated ratio decidendi.149 At
its most fundamental level, the exercise of judicial power through the
rendering of a written opinion serves the express function of providing a
rationale to justify the particular resolution reached by the court. This ratio,

145. Daniel Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1173, 1177 (2006) (“Unless most issues can be regarded as settled most of
the time, coherent discussion is simply impossible.”).
146. Id. at 1178.
147. Id. at 1178–80.
148. If a governmental agency or other sovereign body provides a legal
rationale as the basis for its entry into a consent decree, however, a court may
choose to grant it a larger degree of respect and comity. A consent decree
judgment that reflects extensive participation by a court in drafting or entry may
also merit a greater degree of respect and accord. See id.
149. A ratio decidendi is “[t]he principle or rule of law on which a court’s
decision is founded,” or “the rule of law on which a later court thinks that a
previous court founded its decision”. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY DELUXE NINTH
EDITION at 1376 (2009) (ed. Bryan Garner). A ratio decidendi is “[t]he principle
or rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded,” or “the rule of law on which
a later court thinks that a previous court founded its decision”. Ratio Decidendi,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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then, lies at the heart of the function of precedent and stare decisis. By
providing a reasoned explanation of the judgment reached in a specific case,
a judge offers a rationale for why that judgment is fair and worthy of respect
and deference from both the public at large and future decision-makers. The
judge’s rationale, of course, also serves as the basis for any appellate review
of the court’s decision.
Consent decrees, by definition, need not offer any ratio beyond the
simple agreement of the parties to resolve their dispute in a fashion that meets
the minimal requirements for entry of a consent decree by the court. While
the parties can offer their own legal conclusions in their agreement (or
expressly disclaim the application of other legal doctrines or admissions of
liability), their proffered rationale may not merit the same degree of respect,
deference, or reliance as a ratio provided by a judicial officer vested with the
power to authoritatively resolve disputes before a court. In a lengthy and
complex consent decree, the parties may reach agreement through negotiated
exchanges or “swaps” among provisions that would muddle a coherent or
consistent narrative explanation. As a result, while a future court may find a
rationale offered in a consent decree illuminating or even persuasive, the judge
arguably need not necessarily extend the same degree of deference or concern
for reliance interests that would accompany the application of stare decisis.150
The limited extension of precedential effect to consent decrees, however,
may still make sense in certain circumstances, particularly when a
governmental body is one of the settling parties and is adopting a consistent
rationale for reaching similar consent agreements in future disputes. For
example, at least one federal agency has arguably built its body of consent
orders into a source of functional common law precedent for subsequent legal
determinations.151 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has entered into
numerous consent decrees and settlements to enforce Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), which protects consumer privacy in
transactions.152 As a result, the FTC’s enforcement actions have generated
virtually no judicial decisions because the agency has chosen to settle almost
all of its actions through consent agreements.153 Companies now rely on the
body of consent decrees to guide the formation of their privacy policies, and

150. To some extent, courts implicitly discount the legal impact of consent
decrees on non-parties through stare decisis or other legal mechanisms when they
refuse to allow movants to intervene as of right or permissively to challenge
consent decrees during the negotiation or approval process. Courts frequently find
that the movant has no right to intervene because the consent decree will not affect
their legal rights or remedies in a substantive fashion that would merit permissive
or mandatory intervention as a party.
151. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 66 (discussing precedential value of
administrative consent orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission).
152. Id. at 599, 604–08.
153. Id. at 610 n. 114.
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at least one commissioner has labeled this body of consent agreements as “a
common law of privacy in this country.”154
Some scholastic commenters have agreed and argue that the FTC’s body
of consent agreements “is functionally equivalent to a body of common law”
and is the “most influential regulating force on information privacy in the
United States – more so than nearly any privacy statute or any common law
tort.”155 At least one judicial opinion has taken a similar position and relied
on FTC consent agreement provisions to interpret a state consumer protection
statute modeled on Section 5 of the FTCA.156 The classification of FTC
consent decrees as precedential statements of law, however, has drawn strong
objections from other legal commentators who emphasize the substantive
differences in the common law adjudication process. These objectors also
raise fundamental constitutional concerns.157 Notably, the number of privacy
law settlements by the FTC is much smaller and focused on a discrete number
of coherent legal issues than the expansive body of environmental consent
decrees, which cut across a broad array of statutes and environmental
media.158
The precedential power of prior consent decrees can especially influence
the negotiation and review of successive consent decrees that target a single
industrial sector or focus on a particular environmental practice. For example,
the United States has initiated a series of enforcement actions against
154. Commissioner Julie Brill, Privacy, Consumer Protection, and
Competition
(April
27,
2012),
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacyconsumer-protection-and-competition/120427loyolasymposium.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6ZB-T7ZG].
155. Professors Solove and Hartzog have compiled an extensive catalog of all
FTC consent orders and their functional impact on subsequent enforcement
actions and successive consent agreements. Given the lack of authoritative
judicial precedent and the large number of consent orders that spelled out the
parameters of the FTC’s interpretations of corporate privacy policies, the consent
orders essentially served the same role as a body of common law judicial holdings.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 66 at 587.
156. Veridian Credit Union v. Eddie Bauer, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1161
n.14 (W.D. Wa. 2017); Corey L. Andrews, Federal Courts Embrace of FTC Data
Breach Settlements as Common Law Treads on Due Process, WASHINGTON
LEGAL
FOUNDATION
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/12/19/federal-courts-embrace-of-ftcdata-breach-settlements-as-common-law-treads-on-due-process/#567e6a5f24d1
[https://perma.cc/VN9N-PLSM].
157. Geoffrey A. Manne & Ben Sperry, FTC Process and the Misguided
Notion of an FTC “Common Law” of Data Security, ICLE DATA SECURITY &
PRIVACY WORKING PAPER (2014), https://laweconcenter.org/resource/ftcprocess-misguided-notion-ftc-common-law-data-security/
[https://perma.cc/PQR8-2FZW]; Andrews, supra note 156, at 1.
158. By comparison, the FTC lodged slightly over 170 privacy-related
complaints between 1994 through 2014. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 66 at 600.
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automobile manufacturers that installed “defeat devices” in their vehicles.159
These devices manipulated the emissions of vehicles to produce misleadingly
low levels of pollutants during federally mandated emissions testing
procedures.160 The enforcement initiative yielded a series of consent decrees
against a string of automobile manufacturers, including Volkswagen,161 Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles,162 Derive Systems, Inc.,163 and Harley Davidson.164
The first of these decrees to be lodged, entered into with Volkswagen,
effectively influenced the terms for subsequent settlements and served as a
partial template for future settlements with the other manufacturers.165 By
providing a convincing basis for future negotiations, the Volkswagen decree
effectively led the parties and successive courts to treat it as if it had
precedential (or, at least, strongly persuasive) value.166
If precedential effect is subject to statutory or judicial direction, it raises
two logical questions: can a court choose to give or deny precedential effect
to a consent judgment and decree as part of entering the judgment? If yes, a
159. Seema Kakade, Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement, 44 HARV.
ENV. L. REV. 117, 134 (2020) (publication pending).
160. Id.
161. The United States entered into a series of three partial settlements with
Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc., Volkswagen Group of American Chattanooga Operations, LLC,
and Porsche Cars North America, Inc. The Northern District of California federal
court lodged the first partial settlement on October 25, 2016. The court approved
the other two settlements on May 17, 2017 and April 13, 2017 (regarding civil
penalties and injunctive relief). U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, VOLKSWAGEN
CLEAN AIR ACT CIVIL SETTLEMENT (last visited June 20, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/volkswagen-clean-air-act-civil-settlement
[https://perma.cc/6ZU4-69LC]..
162. U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES
CLEAN
AIR
ACT
SETTLEMENT
INFORMATION
SHEET
(2019),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/fiat-chrysler-automobiles-clean-air-act-civilsettlement-information-sheet [https://perma.cc/RQ6W-G7TW].
163. U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, DERIVE SYSTEMS CLEAN AIR ACT
SETTLEMENT (2018), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/derive-systems-cleanair-actsettlement#:~:text=(Washington%2C%20DC%20%2D%20September%2024,pa
rt%2C%20to%20defeat%20the%20emissions [https://perma.cc/G26D-AH63].
164. United States Motion to Enter Consent Decree, United States v. HarleyDavidson, No. 1:16-cv-01687 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2017); Brief for Petitioner,
United States v. Harley-Davidson (No. 1:16-cv-01687, D.C. Cir., Dec. 11, 2017);
Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed.
Reg. 34,977, 34,977 (July 27, 2017).
165. For example, the State of Wyoming and other states pointed to the terms
of the Volkswagen partial consent decree as a reasonable basis to demand more
from the Harley Davidson proposed consent decree. Kakade, supra note 159 at
149
166. See supra note 162.
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judge’s decision to designate a future consent decree as precedential may
resemble the choice to publish an opinion because it offers a new rule for
decision. Alternatively, can courts look to prior consent decrees to see if they
help identify or incubate new legal principles or rules worthy of binding
effect?

4. Retrospective Review
As an initial option to explore, courts might look retrospectively at the
body of consent judgments already lodged in the public record to search for
emerging persuasive principles or decisions that merit deference. This
approach would effectively “mine” historical consent decrees as potential
sources of legal principles or precedent from agreements entered prior to the
endorsement of this approach.
To do so, a reviewing court could apply the same exegesis to consent
decrees as it would to any other prior judicial opinion. Hallmarks of such an
analysis might include a compelling rationale stated in the decree, a balance
between the number of cases in the subject area decided via consent or trial,
material judicial scrutiny of the consent decree during the original fairness
hearing or entry determination, the number and scope of parties addressed by
decree, the potential practical impact of the consent decree on third parties
unaffiliated with the litigating parties, and any legislative direction or
acquiescence in the consent judgment. As a default rule, consent decree
judgments that fail to meet these prerequisites should have no precedential
effect on future adversarial judicial proceedings (although it could retain
preclusive power over the consenting parties themselves or offer residual
persuasive value to future litigants).
One major hurdle to reviewing prior consent decrees for emergent precedent or persuasive principles is that consent decrees have not been organized,
labeled, and tracked as potential legal sources. As a result, researchers will
need to explore new strategies to identify unifying principles or holdings from
the undifferentiated text in the decrees.167 The large array of consent decrees
on environmental disputes reached between private parties, and between
federal agencies and private parties, will drive the use of creative and

167. This challenge might be met in the future with a growing set of tools used
to extract syntactic relationships from raw texts in other fields. For example,
software systems currently exist to track philological relationships among textual
statements or compilations of textual materials. Similar linguistic analysis can
detect relational links between texts using similar language or citations in
successive versions. This assessment could emphasize, for example, structural
similarities between consent decrees and chronological precedence for certain
categories within consent decrees (such as findings of law). While this type of
software platform could help identify recurring themes, word choices, and
concepts, however, it cannot itself extract a precedential holding or ratio. But it
arguably might help map out the contours and bases for a precedential analysis by
a future judge or litigant.
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innovative techniques to compile and assess the terms contained within the
often voluminous and varied consent decrees. 168
To the extent that it might bestow some degree of precedential legal
force on consent judgments entered by parties who did not know (or expect)
such an effect, a review of prior consent decrees to identify potentially
relevant precedential holdings might raise constitutional concerns about
retroactive effects, due process concerns due to the lack of notice or explicit
consideration, and equal protection concerns because it would treat current
and future litigants differently than past consent decree parties.169 These
concerns, however, surface any time a court changes its consideration of prior
holdings or precedents.170

5. Prospective Designation
To the extent that the historical body of consent decree judgments and
practices could support the creation of precedential authority, appellate courts
and litigants could take the next step: deliberately designate which consent
decrees judgments should be precedential for future litigants.171 This process
could draw on existing procedures used by the federal courts to designate
particular opinions as non-precedential, but effectively in reverse. This
strategy, however, would need to navigate potentially difficult shoals of
constitutional restrictions on Article III powers, risks of party manipulation,
and concerns over the retroactive effects of such judgments on other litigants.
In addition to exploring prior consent decrees as a potential source of
useful precedential values, courts and parties might adopt a deliberate strategy
to identify, construct, and submit consent decrees designed to be precedential

168. As noted earlier, consent decrees reached with governmental entities that
arguably create emergent principles or precedents may require separate
consideration under Skidmore or other deference doctrines. See supra text
accompanying notes 77–91. By contrast, lawsuits to force governmental agencies
into regulatory action would require subsequent administrative action to
implement the decree’s directives. Such decrees would not pose the same
procedural and separation of powers concerns as episodic enforcement litigation
to clarify and enforce legal standards of conduct through judicially approved
settlement decrees with specific parties. See supra text accompanying note 85.
169. These concerns are especially strong when one of the parties to the earlier
consent decree is a governmental party subject to the full force of the U.S.
Constitution’s limits on enumerated federal parties and the Bill of Rights.
Consent decrees between purely private parties may not evoke similar levels of
concern.
170. Beske, supra note 126 at 812, 848–852.
171. Typically, a rendering court cannot dictate whether future courts will give
precedential effect to one of its decisions. To the extent that a rendering court can
decide whether to “publish” its opinion in non-precedential form, however, it does
have at least some ability to define the universe of potential opinions that
subsequent courts can consider for precedential effect.
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vehicles. Parties could prospectively request the court to enter their consent
agreements as judgments with precedential effect, and then calibrate the
approval hearing and record to buttress its precedential value. A judge might
also retain the discretion to designate a consent decree judgment as a
precedential opinion sua sponte. This power would parallel the discretion that
courts currently enjoy choosing whether to publish their opinions and,
effectively, grant them precedential weight.172 Notably, even for opinions that
a court declines to publish, other judges may nonetheless accord them “as
merited” effect.173
This approach to accord persuasive or precedential weight to consent
decrees would offer several advantages over the retrospective mining of prior
consent decrees. First, by allowing parties to identify and adopt consent
decrees as potential precedential vehicles, the litigants could negotiate and
accept terms without risk of unfair surprise or unintended side effects.
Second, consent decrees labeled as potentially precedential would likely
receive additional scrutiny from the reviewing court and deeper public
comment and participation by interested parties. Third, the court would retain
ultimate control over whether consent decrees would prospectively have
precedential effect. Allowing the court to designate a consent decree as
publishable – because of its possible instructive or persuasive effect – and
precedential would preserve the court’s power over its holdings even when
that judgment relies on terms drafted or adopted by the litigants rather than
the court.
To assure that only those consent decrees meriting such impact or where
the consenting parties and the court wish to extend a precedential value to
their agreement,174 consent decrees likely would not have a precedential effect

172. Beske, supra note 126, at 816–818. The decision to publish an opinion
can have special impact for consent decrees entered by appellate courts. While
district court opinions only have horizontal precedential effect, appellate court
judgments also bind lower courts through vertical stare decisis. See supra text
accompanying note 123. Notably, even the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to
exercise explicit control over the precedential effect of its own decisions,
including some of the Court’s most momentous rulings. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.”). But even in this case, some appellate courts have nonetheless
cited Bush v. Gore in equal protection challenges to voting arrangements by states
which allegedly discriminated against protected populations. Despite the Court’s
caution, lower courts have already cited Bush v. Gore in 468 cases as of May 2020
according to a Westlaw search.
173. Beske, supra note 126 at 816 n.41 (noting circuit appellate court rules
that allow citation of unpublished opinions for their persuasive value or guidance,
but denying them precedential force).
174. The critical role of the court in reviewing a proposed consent decree’s
fairness and legality will also need to explicitly assure that the proposed decree
does not suffer from collusive strategic behavior by the litigants or inadequate
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as a default unless the court or parties affirmatively seek to create it. If so, the
failure by the parties – or the court – to move to designate a consent decree
for publication or precedential value would effectively mean that the decree
held no outright persuasive or precedential effect. But such unpublished or
undesignated consent decree opinions could remain available as sources of
persuasive argument or information for future cases at the discretion of the
court.
One possible complication to this approach might arise if the parties
disagree on whether to seek the court’s designation of their consent agreement
as precedential, but this scenario appears extremely unlikely. In part, the
consensual predicate necessary to reach a consent decree might include an
agreement to seek precedential value as an integral part of the underlying
judgment. In addition, under their current rules of procedure, the federal
appellate courts reserve the discretion to publish an opinion and give it
precedential value solely for themselves.175
Current procedures used to review and enter consent decrees could
readily be modified to incorporate additional elements for published or precedential consent decrees. Given their potential effects on third parties not
before the court, the parties should expect either to provide broader notice
through public media or, if the United States has an interest in the litigation,
official publication of notice in the Federal Register. The court may also need
to allow the introduction of statements, evidence, or information for judicial
notice if the record supporting the consent decree’s entry requires expansion
to support its potential legal effect on future proceedings. Appellate review
of the legal aspects of the consent decree would, like any other trial court legal
determination, remain subject to de novo review, although other aspects of the
consent decree that incorporate factual findings or compromise of the adverse
parties’ interests may require a more deferential review.
The controversy over sue-and-settle consent decrees, which involve
decrees that bind the United States to future regulatory action allegedly
without the constraints of legislative direction or full regulatory process,
involves parallel but distinct issues.176 The availability of special procedures

representation. For example, if parties seek to “manufacture” favorable precedent
through collusively entering into a consent decree, a reviewing court may find that
the decree either is unfair or that the underlying parties lack an adversarial dispute
that would support standing and justiciability.
175. Notably, some appellate court decisions not to publish an opinion have
sparked dissenting opinions.
Beske, supra note 126 at 819–20 n.56
(“Nonprecedential decisions frequently include dissents, even in circuits whose
rules specify that an opinion “shall be designated” precedential if it alters,
modifies, or clarifies existing law”) (footnotes omitted). None of these
challenges, however, have resulted from direct objections by parties to the court’s
decision not to publish the underlying opinion.
176. Similar concerns have limited the use of nonmutual issue preclusion
against the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159–
63 (1984).
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and legal scrutiny of consent decrees that may create a persuasive or
precedential effect, however, may offer a solution for the concerns raised in
the sue-and-settle context. By requiring such settlements to undergo a similar
level of heightened scrutiny and enhanced public input and comment, the
court may minimize the concerns that such decrees frustrate constitutional
interests in separation of powers, due process, and democratic accountability.

IV. TEST RUNS, CAUTIONS, AND CAVEATS
Using these principles as a base, the next step in exploring the legal
weight of consent decrees would focus on the terms and parameters of specific
decrees that address a shared topic or concern. By comparing the overlapping
and contrasting terms of varying consent decrees on a common topic, it should
be possible to identify an emerging consensus on standards of expected care
in their substantive terms, judicial endorsement of liability or management
principles embedded in deferential reviews of the decrees’ fairness and
legality, and any persuasive or precedential rationales contained in decrees
that a future court may note. Some logical candidates for this type of
comparative analysis, for example, might include decrees that set out
emerging standards for remediation or treatment of perfluorooctanoic acid
(“PFOA”) or perfluorooctane sulfonate (“PFOS contamination”),177 expected
operational standards for control flares or monitoring devices at electrical
power plants and refineries,178 emerging standards for valuing injuries arising
from cultural or religious aspects of natural resources injuries,179 or liability
arising from the use of defeat devices to skew mobile source emissions
testing.180

177. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher Scientific Company, L.L.C. et al, Docket
No. 2:20-cv-00135 (D.N.J. Jan 03, 2020) (entry of consent decree specifying
remediation obligations for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane
sulfonate (PFOS) contamination by relying on New Jersey drinking water
criteria); Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. Wolverine World
Wide, Inc., Docket No. 1:18-cv-00039 (W.D. Mich. Jan 10, 2018) (clean-up
criteria for spilled PFOA pursuant to Michigan state standards).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 80–84 (enforcement actions centered
on emissions monitoring and flare combustion efficiency at refineries and power
plants).
179. Connie Sue Manos Martin, Spiritual and Cultural Resources as a
Component of Tribal natural Resource Damages Claims, 20 PUBLIC LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1999).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Punch It Performance and Tuning LLC et al,
Docket No. 6:19-cv-01115 (M.D. Fla. Jun 14, 2019); United States v. Derive
Systems, Inc., Docket No. 1:18-cv-02201 (D.D.C. Sept 24, 2018); Montana
Department of Environmental Quality v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Docket
No. 6:17-cv-00003 (D. Mont. Jan 13, 2017); Davila et al v. Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc. et al, Docket No. 7:16-cv-00695 (S.D. Tex. Dec 22, 2016); State of
Tennessee v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Docket No. 3:16-cv-06546 (N.D.
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This path, of course, has potential pitfalls, and giving legal weight to
consent decrees in future disputes raises several potential concerns. The most
immediate objection is that this process will open the courts to strategic
consent decree initiatives that will seek to manufacture or manipulate
precedential authority. Allowing parties to agree to language with
precedential or persuasive effect, that a court will then enter as a formal judgment, may open the pathway to conscious efforts to enter strategic consent
decrees that will create new threads of holdings to favor particular parties or
interests in future litigation.
This concern has merit, but it overstates the risk. In part, this type of
manipulation of the litigative process to create favorable precedents or
authority already routinely occurs. For example, plaintiffs in high-profile
environmental cases may choose to give defendants settlement terms in
exchange for not appealing a favorable ruling.181 On a lesser scale, parties
may choose not to bring or to appeal judgments involving contentious legal
issues if they fear an unfavorable ruling with greater import from an appellate
court.182 This type of precedent sculpting by litigants currently occurs largely
outside any judicial scrutiny or review. By contrast, a judicial review of a
consent decree tagged for precedential effect by the parties can expressly
come under judicial review for exactly these concerns prior to entry of the
decree.183
Second, the court may have more latitude when approving consent
decrees than it does when issuing a judgment after a contested proceeding. In
some circumstances, the parties can agree to remedial actions in a consent
decree which a judge cannot order under the underlying statute.184 This

Cal. Nov 10, 2016); State of Tennessee, ex rel. et al v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, Docket No. 3:16-cv-02767 (M.D. Tenn. Oct 21, 2016);
Massachusetts v. Volkswagen AG, Docket No. 1:16-cv-11690 (D. Mass. Aug 19,
2016); United States v. Volkswagen AG, Docket No. 3:16-cv-00295 (N.D. Cal.
Jan 19, 2016).
181. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010))
(appellate court judgment in favor of Tennessee Valley Authority); Federal Court
Gives Final Approval to TVA Pollution Control Settlement, BLOOMBERG
ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY REPORT at 1 (June 30, 2011); U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement (April
14, 2011) (announcing settlement of parallel lawsuit with EPA), available at
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/tennessee-valley-authority-clean-air-actsettlement .
182. This calculus occurs routinely in decisions by environmental advocates
not to seek certiorari review of appellate decisions because they fear an adverse
decision from the U.S. Supreme Court with greater coverage and impact.
183. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
184. Even if the parties resolve their differences through a consent decree, the
court’s authority to issue an injunction to enforce that decree obviously remains
subject to constitutional limits. See United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
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penumbra of supplemental authority arises from the court’s preference to
approve settlements and resolve disputes, the lack of objection by the parties
to the extraordinary relief, and the inherent authority of courts to approve and
oversee settlements.185 If the parties – or court – have identified a consent
decree as a candidate for persuasive or precedential effect, the scope of the
decree’s proffered relief or extra-statutory terms may require special scrutiny
by the court during the fairness hearing or comment period.
Consent judgments that incorporate or work in tandem with criminal
plea agreements require separate consideration. Given that civil violations of
regulatory requirements can also theoretically lead to criminal prosecution in
many circumstances, criminal plea agreements that incorporate consent
decree terms can raise issues similar to civil environmental consent decrees.
But there are deep concerns evoked by the need to protect defendants’
constitutional rights in criminal prosecutions,186 the structural complexities
created by parallel enforcement proceedings,187 and the growing circuit
conflict over the scope of permissible environmental criminal liability for
misdemeanor malum prohibitum offenses rooted in simple negligence or strict
liability.188 Courts may choose in these cases to either decline requests to
promulgate criminal consent settlements (or non-prosecution agreements) as
judicial opinion with precedential value or to subject them to much deeper
scrutiny than their review of civil consent decrees.
Beyond these operational risks and concerns, some larger cautions and
observations remain. From a pragmatic perspective, the negotiation of
consent decrees is hard enough, and adding the potential risk of precedential
effects could make the negotiation process even harder. But if consent decrees
already potentially have these effects without the parties’ consideration or
careful intent, making this element explicit during the consent decree lodging
process would help rationalize the process and avoid unwanted impacts from
decrees. More abstractly, if consent decrees wield influence from all three
mechanisms outlined in this Article at the same time, the three pathways may

Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 581, 586 (1971) (state court injunction issued pursuant
to consent decree violated First Amendment free speech protection).
185. See supra text accompanying note 18.
186. See Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law:
Reading the Supreme Court Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVT’L L.J. 861, 867–70
(1996).
187. See Memorandum, Parallel Proceedings Policy, Granta Nakayama,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement, September 24, 2007 (most recent
Parallel Proceedings Policy guidance affirming the Agency’s “policies regarding
coordinated use of EPA’s civil and criminal authorities to achieve environmental
compliance.”),
available
at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/parallel-proceedingspolicy-09-24-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T9N-NLUF].
188. Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407,
2446–47, 2453–54, 2480, 2523 (1995).
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influence each other or have unexpected synergistic effects. And if courts will
give consent decrees some influential authority through fairness hearings or
public comments, the consent decree approval process should be more
transparent and easier to access. This step should include judicial scrutiny, or
express restrictions, on non-disclosure agreements or other devices to cloak
consent decree negotiations and lodgings in secrecy.
But even with these concerns, consent decrees may offer an opportunity
for courts to hew legal precedent and doctrines from terms struck directly by
the parties themselves (with some judicial oversight and participation). This
Article assumes that consent decrees are worth the effort, and their benefits in
resolving environmental disputes and assuring proper implementation of
remedies outweigh their costs and procedural hurdles. These suggested
reforms allow a conscious and rational extension of their benefits to future
litigants. Equipped with this analytical framework, we should welcome
further empirical analysis and assessment of existing decrees as well as the
additional study of the entry of future decrees to shed light on how consent
decrees can discover and generate new and useful principles of environmental
law.
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